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I. INTRODUCTION
O VER THE LAST thirty years, but especially during the past
decade, federal courts have wrestled with the issue of pre-
emption in aviation litigation. Not surprisingly, the courts have
come to differing results. Some held that there is no federal
preemption at all; others delivered forceful opinions holding
that, given the breadth and detail of federal aviation regulation,
federal law preempts state law standards of care completely.
Still other courts searched for a middle ground-applying fed-
eral preemption principles sparingly under narrowly defined
facts. The result of these decisions, particularly those rendered
by the federal courts of appeals, is a potential circuit-split that
may prompt the Supreme Court's first reconsideration of fed-
eral preemption in the context of aviation safety litigation in
more than thirty-five years. Until then, however, practitioners
must be well-apprised of recent developments-and possible
emerging trends-concerning standard of care preemption.
We hope this article will aid in that effort.
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The article is organized in four parts.' Part I introduces key
principles of federal preemption law recognized by the courts,
including a taxonomy of the different types of preemption. In
Part II, we discuss three Supreme Court decisions that, while not
aviation cases, explain the interplay between the various types of
preemption and how that interplay can govern the outcome of
individual preemption cases. This discussion also provides con-
text for our analysis in Part IV of three recent airline cases. In
Part III, we review relevant federal aviation legislation, princi-
pally the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, and the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994.
Finally, in Section IV, we address three recent appellate deci-
sions dealing with federal preemption principles applied in air
safety litigation.
II. KEY PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution says that federal
law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing."' 2 This clause delegates to Congress the power to enact fed-
eral statutes that preempt state law. Because Congress has the
constitutionally mandated power to preempt state law, the cen-
tral question for courts in deciding preemption issues is prima-
rily one of congressional intent.4 Such intent may be found in a
I An earlier version of this article was presented on March 31, 2011, at the
Forty-Fifth Annual SMU Air Law Symposium. The authors wish to thank Mr.
Charles A. Tarpley and the Air Law Symposium Board of Editors for inviting us to
submit our work and participate in the Symposium. We also wish to thank
Christina Arnone, an associate at Stinson Morrison Hecker, and Frank Tankard,
a student at the University of Missouri, Kansas City School of Law, for their valua-
ble research and editorial assistance.
2 U.S. CONST. art. VI. "The phrase 'any [state law] to the Contrary notwith-
standing' is a non obstante provision." Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2579
(2011). "Eighteenth-century legislatures used non obstante provisions to specify
the degree to which a new statute was meant to repeal older, potentially conflict-
ing statutes in the same field." Id.; see also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV.
225, 234, 252-53 (2000) (describing discussion of the Supremacy Clause in state
ratification debates as concerning whether federal law could repeal state law or
vice versa).
3 Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 509
(1989) ("Congress has the power under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of
the Constitution to pre-empt state law. Determining whether it has exercised this
power requires that we examine congressional intent.").
4 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("'[T]he purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." (quoting Retail
Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
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statute's express language or through its structure and purpose.5
Because federal law is supreme, any state law-including com-
mon law as applied by the states6 -which "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress" is preempted.'
A. TYPES OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The taxonomy of federal preemption law is imprecise and can
be confusing.8 Before discussing specific cases, therefore, we
will first outline the various types of preemption recognized by
the courts, explain briefly how each type is applied, and, in Part
II infra, discuss three important Supreme Court decisions in
which the Court interpreted how the various types of preemp-
tion interact.
The Supreme Court has identified two general types of fed-
eral preemption-express and implied.' Express preemption is
as it sounds: state laws are preempted because Congress has ex-
pressly said they are preempted, usually by including a preemp-
tion clause or other similar provision within the enacted law.10
Implied preemption, on the other hand, is found (usually, but
not always, in the absence of an express preemption clause)
where Congress impliedly preempts state law by the breadth or
5 Id. at 486 (citations omitted).
6 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324-25 (2008) ("[W]hile the com-
mon-law remedy is limited to damages, a liability award can be, indeed is de-
signed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. In
the present case, there is nothing to contradict this normal meaning. To the
contrary, in the context of [the Medical Device Act of 1976] excluding common-
law duties from the scope of pre-emption would make little sense." (internal quo-
tations omitted)).
7 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (noting that the Court's "primary
function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of [a] particular case,
[the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress"); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
1, 211 (1824) (finding that state laws which "interfere with, or are contrary to the
laws of Congress," are invalid).
8 See, e.g., Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 126 (3d Cir. 2010)
("Courts have recognized three species of preemption: express preemption, con-
flict preemption, and field preemption."). For a fuller discussion of the Elassaad
case, see infra Section V.A.
9 See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2008) ("Congress may
indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute's express language or through its
structure and purpose." (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977))).
10 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
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thoroughness with which its federal enactment has occupied a
particular area of law.11
Implied preemption may be organized into two sub-types: im-
plied field preemption and implied conflict preemption.12 Im-
plied field preemption is found where "state law ... regulates
conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Govern-
ment to occupy exclusively."'" Such intent may be discerned in
one of two ways. First, it "may be inferred from a 'scheme of
federal regulation . . .so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it."' 14 Second, it may also be found "where an Act of Con-
gress 'touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.' 1 5
The other sub-type of implied preemption-implied conflict
preemption-may also be organized into two varieties. The first
is found where a private party's efforts to comply with compet-
ing federal and state law or regulation is physically impossible. 16
Impossibility conflict has been a frequent issue in drug labeling
litigation, for example. 17 The other variety of implied conflict
11 Id.
12 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) ("Absent ex-
plicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre-
emption: field pre-emption . . .and conflict pre-emption .....
13 English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
14 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
15 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). We discuss yet
another type of implied field preemption-"complete preemption"-in a some-
what different context later in the paper. See infra Part II.D.1.
16 Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,153 (1982) ("Even
where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area,
state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a
conflict arises when 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a phys-
ical impossibility."' (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963))).
17 See generally Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2578 (2011) (holding that
"it was impossible for the [m]anufacturers to comply with both their state-law
duty to change the label and their federal law duty to keep the label the same");
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1196 (2009) ("The FDA's
premarket approval of a new drug application includes the approval of the exact
text in the proposed label."). Such a conflict does not require preemption, how-
ever, so long as compliance with federal and state law "'is theoretically possible."'
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290-91 (1987) (citation
omitted). Moreover, the "hypothetical" possibility of a conflict "is insufficient to
warrant[ ] pre-emption." Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982);
see also English, 496 U.S. at 90 ("The 'teaching of this Court's decisions ... en-
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preemption is found where state law is an obstacle to compli-
ance with what Congress intended to be in the enacted federal
law. 18 This aspect of implied conflict preemption is unique "be-
cause there is no direct conflict with any federal law precisely on
point-for example, either the preemption provision or a pri-
mary regulatory provision."' 9 One commentator suggested that
obstacle conflict preemption is simply a midpoint between di-
rect conflict preemption and field preemption.2 °
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality in Gade v. National
Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, summed up this taxonomy as
follows:
Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and "is com-
pelled whether Congress' [s] command is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and pur-
pose." Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized
at least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption,
where the scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it," and conflict pre-emption, where
"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility," or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the
join[s] seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none
clearly exists."' (alterations in original) (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960))).
18 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000) ("Because
the rule of law for which petitioners contend would have stood 'as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of' [those] important means-related federal
objectives [in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard]," the Court held that
the state tort claim was preempted. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941))).
14 Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2104
(2000).
Obstacle preemption thus moves the displacement analysis along
the spectrum away from the direct action extreme by both relaxing
the standard for conflict-from direct conflict to obstacle to accom-
plishment-and expanding the evidence of congressional intent-
from statutory text to purposes and objectives. Such progression
challenges the notion of a generalized presumption against pre-
emption because both doctrinal alterations infuse more ambiguity
into the analysis.
Id.
20 Id. at 2105 ("Obstacle preemption stands at the midway point between con-
flict and field preemption. Like conflict preemption, it displaces only those state
laws that are inconsistent with federal law. Like field preemption, the relevant
federal law is not a specific provision or even a statute, but rather some broad
regulatory scheme or independent interests external to the Supremacy Clause
conflict analysis.").
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accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress." 2'
Becoming familiar with the various types of federal preemp-
tion is not a purely academic exercise. Recent Supreme Court
and federal appellate court decisions have focused much atten-
tion on the interplay between the types of federal preemption.
More specifically, the decisions examined how courts should de-
cide whether federal law preempts state law when more than
one type of preemption is in play.2 2 Without some familiarity
with preemption terminology, much of the case law (and much
of what follows here) may be unclear.
B. A PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
In addition to the Tenth Amendment's reserving to the states
all powers not delegated to the federal government,23 respect
for the states as "independent sovereigns in our federal system"
has led the Supreme Court to "presume that Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. "24 Because federal
preemption nullifies the application of conflicting state law and
because such nullification runs counter to the Framers' concep-
tion of the dual sovereignty of federalism, the Supreme Court
established a presumption that law traditionally left to the states
is not to be preempted.2 5 Under our federalist system, "the
States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal
Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the
Supremacy Clause. '26 To the extent the Supremacy Clause gives
the federal government "a decided advantage in [a] delicate bal-
21 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (citations
omitted).
22 See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S.Ct. 1131 (2011).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
24 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (holding state common
law claims arising from failure of pace-maker were not preempted by Medical
Device Amendments of 1976).
25 See id. As the Framers observed, "the compound republic of America" pro-
vides "a double security ... to the rights of the people" because "the power sur-
rendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each sub-divided among distinct and separate depart-
ments." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 266 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
. 26 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). Furthermore, "under this system
of dual sovereignty, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently held that state courts
have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate
claims arising under the laws of the United States." Id.
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ance" between federal and state sovereigns, 27 courts have cre-
ated a presumption to keep that balance in equipoise.
In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Con-
gress has "legislated ... in a field which the States have tradition-
ally occupied," [courts] "start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.
28
The Supreme Court cautioned that "despite the variety of
these opportunities for federal preeminence, we have never as-
sumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but
instead have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state
law.''29
In what is perhaps a gross understatement, the Court noted in
Malone v. White Motor Corp. that "[o]ften Congress does not
clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to pre-empt state
laws." ° Courts have held, therefore, that when a preemption
clause may be given more than one plausible interpretation, a
court will ordinarily "accept the reading that disfavors pre-emp-
tion."' Federal courts should be hesitant-indeed, even "reluc-
tant"-to find preemption absent a clear directive from
27 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). "As long as it is acting within
the powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on
the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States.
This is an extraordinary power in a federalist system." Id.
28 Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
29 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995) (holding a New York statute requiring hospitals to
collect surcharges from patients covered by a commercial insurer but not from
patients insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan does not "relate to" employee
benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption provision, and accord-
ingly is not preempted).
30 Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
[I]n such instances, the courts normally sustain local regulation of
the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law or would
frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the
totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the
field to the exclusion of the States.
Id.
31 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) ("Even if Dow had
offered us a plausible alternative reading of [the preemption provision of Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.]-
indeed, even if its alternative were just as plausible as our reading of that text-
we would nevertheless have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-
emption.").
334
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Congress.3 2 As Justice White wrote for the majority in CSX
Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, "[i]n the interest of avoiding
unintended encroachment on the authority of the States ... a
court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject tradi-
tionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-
emption."3
The presumption against preemption does not apply, how-
ever, in areas of the law the states have not traditionally occu-
pied.3 4 While a dominant federal interest in a field supports
asserting federal preemption, "the mere existence of a federal
regulatory or enforcement scheme . . .does not by itself imply
pre-emption. 35 According to the Supreme Court, "[t]he case
for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has
indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of
federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to 'stand by both
concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between
them.' 136 Thus, a proponent of federal preemption must either
demonstrate a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to super-
sede state control or convince the court that the state has not
traditionally occupied the field at issue. 7
32 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1993).
33 Id. (holding that under the Federal Railway Safety Act federal regulations
adopted by the Secretary of Transportation preempted respondent's negligence
action).
34 See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48
(2001) (holding that "[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly 'a field
which the States have traditionally occupied,"' and that patients' "state-law fraud-
on-the-FDA claims ... [were] therefore impliedly pre-empted by [the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), as amended by the Medical Device Amend-
ments (MDA)]." Adopting this rationale, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has recently held that the field of aviation safety is not a field the states
have traditionally occupied, thereby extirpating the presumption against pre-
emption. See US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1325 (10th Cir.
2010).
35 English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 87 (1990).
36 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,166-67 (1989)
(alteration in original) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
256 (1984)).
37 In his dissent in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,Justice Stevens wrote that
the presumption's "requirement that Congress speak clearly" when preempting
state law allows "the structural safeguards inherent in the normal operation of
the legislative process [to] operate to defend state interests from undue infringe-
ment." Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Notes, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An
Empirical Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1608 (2007) (finding that by refusing to guess at Congress's
intent and thus "requiring Congress to speak clearly when preempting state law,
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The presumption is not without its critics. Justice Scalia has
been harshly critical, calling the presumption "an extraordinary
and unprecedented principle of federal statutory construc-
tion. ' 38 His objections, stated most succinctly in his dissent in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., are two-fold. First, as an adherent
to strict statutory construction, Justice Scalia finds objectionable
that, despite the opportunity to do so in earlier cases, the Court
has never recognized or applied the presumption until Justice
Stevens wrote for the majority in Cipollone.9 Justice Scalia
pointed to an opinion rendered just weeks before Cipollone was
handed down:
Less than a month ago, in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,"
we held that the Airline Deregulation Act's provision preempting
state laws "relating to [airline] rates, routes, or services" was
broad enough to reach state fare advertising regulations despite
the availability of plausible limiting constructions. We made no
mention of any "plain-statement" rule, or rule of narrow con-
struction, but applied the usual "assumption that the ordinary mean-
ing of [the statutory] language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.". . .We said not a word about a "presumption against...
pre-emption" that was to be applied to construction of the text."
Second, as a matter of simple logic, Justice Scalia found it odd
that the Court would require a narrow reading of the express
preemption provisions of a congressional enactment, but at the
same time be willing to find in other circumstances that state
laws are preempted in the absence of any express statement by
Congress to that effect, e.g., implied preemption.42 He describes
what he views as a double-standard in this way:
In light of our willingness to find pre-emption in the absence of
any explicit statement of pre-emptive intent, the notion that such
explicit statements, where they exist, are subject to a "plain-state-
ment" rule is more than somewhat odd. To be sure, our jurispru-
dence abounds with rules of "plain statement," "clear statement,"
the Court forces Congress to notify states that their interests are threatened,
thereby allowing states to protect themselves" from the preemptive effect of fed-
eral legislation); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv.
1349, 1385 (2001) (arguing that the presumption against preemption "makes
sure that all the states' potential defenders have notice of what is at stake").
38 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part).
39 Id. at 545-46.
40 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
41 Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 546 (citations omitted).
42 Id. at 546-47.
336
2011] STANDARD OF CARE PREEMPTION 337
and "narrow construction" designed variously to ensure that, ab-
sent unambiguous evidence of Congress's intent, extraordinary
constitutional powers are not invoked, or important constitu-
tional protections eliminated, or seemingly inequitable doctrines
applied. But none of those rules exists alongside a doctrine
whereby the same result so prophylactically protected from care-
less explicit provision can be achieved by sheer implication, with no
express statement of intent at all. That is the novel regime the
Court constructs today.4"
We leave it to the reader to judge whether Justice Scalia has
the better of this argument. In either event, practitioners
should remain aware that, based on the majority opinion in Ci-
pollone, courts are likely to apply a presumption against finding
express preemption under any of the relevant federal aviation
statutes.
C. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW STANDARDS OF CARE
Courts have considered, and categorically rejected, the notion
that federal aviation statutes preempt state-law-based remedies for
persons injured or killed in aviation accidents.44 At most, the
scope of preemption has been limited to the standard of care ap-
plied to negligence, strict liability, and other tort-based claims.
However pervasive FAA regulations may be, they have not been
recognized to bar state-law tort remedies otherwise available to
persons injured in an airplane accident.45
43 Id. (citations omitted).
44 See, e.g., Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 125 (3d Cir. 2010)
("We did not conclude in Abdullah that the passengers' common law negligence
claims themselves were preempted; instead, we determined only that the stan-
dard of care used in adjudicating those claims was preempted. Local law still
governed the other negligence elements (breach, causation, and damages), as
well as the choice and availability of remedies.").
45 Bennett v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 484 F.3d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 2007); see alsoAbdul-
lah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 376 (3d. Cir. 1999) (" [W]e cannot infer from
Congress's intent to federally preempt the standards of care [in aviation accident
litigation], that Congress also intended to bar state and territorial tort reme-
dies."). Bennett has proved persuasive with a number of courts, both in and
outside of the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 8:09
CV 40, 2010 WL 4721189, at * 15 (D. Neb. July 21, 2010) (granting a motion to
remand because the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt the state standard of
care; Cessna failed to establish a colorable federal defense to support federal
officer removal jurisdiction); Gonzales v. Ever-Ready Oil Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d
1187, 1195 (D.N.M. 2008) ("Congress did not create a federal cause of action to
enforce the federal regulations regarding service of alcoholic beverages by air-
lines, which 'strongly indicat[es] that Congress did not intend to create a sub-
stantial federal question over cases implicating the FAA and FARs."'); O.S. ex rel.
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Because the legislative history of the FAA and its judicial inter-
pretation indicate that Congress's intent was to federally regulate
aviation safety, we find that any state or territorial standards of
care relating to aviation safety are federally preempted....
It follows from the evident intent of Congress that there be
federal supervision of air safety and from the decisions in which
courts have found federal preemption of discrete, safety-related
matters, that federal law preempts the general field of aviation
safety ....
Thus, in determining the standards of care in an aviation neg-
ligence action, a court must refer not only to specific regulations
but also to the overall concept that aircraft may not be operated
in a careless or reckless manner. The applicable standard of care
is not limited to a particular regulation of a specific area; it ex-
pands to encompass the issue of whether the overall operation or
conduct in question was careless or reckless....
We conclude, therefore, that because of the need for one, con-
sistent means of regulating aviation safety, the standard applied
in determining if there has been careless or reckless operation of
an aircraft should be federal ..... 4
A number of courts, however, have continued to use the state
law standard of care, along with state remedies. They concluded
that the standards of care related to aviation safety by implica-
tion must not be preempted because expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.47 "Another rationale for finding that federal law does
not preempt state and territorial safety standards rests upon the
observation that Congress directed the Administrator to pre-
scribe 'minimum standards' to promote safety."4 "Because the
federal standards are 'minimum,' some courts have determined
Sakar v. Hageland Aviation Servs., 609 F. Supp. 2d 889, 891-92 (D. Alaska 2008)
(holding Federal Aviation Act does not contain an implied private right of action,
and following the Supreme Court's holding in Beneficial, the FAA does not re-
quire removal of all aviation safety claims).
46 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 371-72.
47 See, e.g., Pub. Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 294-95 (11th
Cir. 1993); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1443-44 (10th Cir.
1993). Clevelands continuing utility as precedent has been seriously challenged
by the Tenth Circuit's more recent decision in US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnel. US
Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326 (10th Cir. 2010); see infra notes
443-490 and accompanying text.
48 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 373; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(5) ("[t]he Adminis-
trator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce by prescribing . . . (5) regulations and minimum stan-
dards for other practices, methods, and procedure the Administrator finds neces-
sary for safety in air commerce and national security.").
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that a common law duty of safety may be owed beyond the FAA
regulations."4 9
The § 91.13(a) prohibition of "careless or reckless" operation of
an aircraft occupies the apparent void beyond the specified "min-
imum" standards. Therefore, because the Administrator has pro-
vided both general and specific standards, there is no need to
look to state or territorial law to provide standards beyond those
established by the Administrator.
The FAA's saving clause provides: "A remedy under this part is
in addition to any other remedies provided by law." The insur-
ance clause requires that airlines maintain liability insurance "for
bodily injury to, or death of, an individual.., resulting from the
operation or maintenance of the aircraft." These two sections
have been interpreted to mean that state safety standards are not
preempted because Congress provided for compensation of in-
jured persons.
These two sections do demonstrate that Congress intended to
allow for compensation of persons who were injured in aviation
mishaps. As we point out in our answer to the second part of the
certified question, however, we do not find that state and territo-
rial law remedies are preempted, only the standards of care for
the safe operation of aircraft.
Clearly, Congress did not intend to prohibit state damage rem-
edies by this language. Moreover, the insurance clause requires
airlines to maintain liability insurance "for bodily injury to, or
death of, an individual.., resulting from the operation or main-
tenance of the aircraft." Congress could not have intended to
abolish a damage remedy for injury or death if it required air-
lines to maintain insurance coverage to recompense injured
persons.5o
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., the Court continued:
No doubt there is tension between the conclusion that safety reg-
ulation is the exclusive concern of the federal law and the con-
clusion that a state may nevertheless award damages based on its
own law of liability. But as we understand what was done over the
years in the legislation concerning nuclear energy, Congress in-
tended to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever ten-
sion there was between them. We can do no less. It may be that
the award of damages based on the state law of negligence or
strict liability is regulatory in the sense that a nuclear plant will be
49 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 373-74.
50 Id. at 374-75 (citations omitted).
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threatened with damages liability if it does not conform to state
standards, but that regulatory consequence was something that
Congress was quite willing to accept.
We do not suggest that there could never be an instance in
which the federal law would preempt the recovery of damages
based on state law. But insofar as damages for radiation injuries
are concerned, preemption should not be judged on the basis
that the federal government has so completely occupied the field
of safety that state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there
is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state stan-
dards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a damages
action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. We per-
ceive no such conflict or frustration in the circumstances of this
case.
51
The conduct that the jury's punitive damages award sought to
regulate was the day-to-day safety procedures of nuclear licen-
sees. There was no factual finding as to how the contamination
of Karen Silkwood occurred; the trial judge expressly refused to
give an instruction on intentional infliction, and thejury rejected
Kerr-McGee's suggestion that Silkwood intentionally contami-
nated herself. It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the punitive
damages award in this case deters a nuclear facility from operat-
ing in the same manner as Kerr-McGee. Authority for a State to
do so, however, is precisely what the Court held to be preempted
in Pacific Gas.5 2
Punitive damages, in contrast, are calculated to compel adher-
ence to a particular standard of safety-and it need not be a fed-
eral standard. In setting the punitive damages award in this case,
the court instructed the jury to consider "the financial worth of
the defendant" and award an "amount of exemplary damages...
consistent with the general purpose of such an award in deter-
ring the defendant, and others like it, from committing similar
acts in the future." The punitive damages award therefore en-
ables a State to enforce a standard that is more exacting than the
federal standard.53
"The punitive damage award upheld by the Court had both
the purpose and the intended effect of punishing and deterring
the type of conduct that caused radiation injuries."54
51 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984).
52 Id. at 261 (citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 264-65.
54 Allen R. Ferguson, Jr., Comment, Federal Supremacy Versus Legitimate State In-
terests in Nuclear Regulation: Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood, 33 CATH. U. L. REv.
899, 934 (1984).
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D. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AS A BASIS FOR
REMOVAL JURISDICTION
The Judiciary Act of 1875, which codified Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution,55 gave federal courts general jurisdiction
over all cases "arising under" federal law.5 6 The current version
of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provides original federal jurisdic-
tion only when the claim for relief depends on federal law "un-
aided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of
defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose. 5 7
This limitation is better known as the "well-pleaded complaint"
rule.58 Under the rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs prop-
erly pleaded complaint. "5  Courts may look only to the com-
plaint, and not to any possible or anticipated defenses, to
determine if the case arises under federal law.6 ° A defendant's
answer or other responsive pleading which raises a federal ques-
tion is usually not enough to confer "arising under" federal
jurisdiction.61
The well-pleaded complaint rule, however, does not answer
the underlying question of whether the complaint states a fed-
eral claim. The rule says only where the federal issue must ap-
pear-in the complaint, and not in the answer-for the claims
to give rise to federal jurisdiction. To determine what must be
pled to raise a federal question is a distinct issue. Although
55 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .... ").
56 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)). As currently codified, the statute provides: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
57 Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914) ("[I]t has become firmly set-
tled that whether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of
the United States ... must be determined from what necessarily appears in the
plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by any-
thing alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the
defendant may interpose." (citation omitted)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
58 Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) ("Under
our longstanding interpretation of the current statutory scheme, the question
whether a claim 'arises under' federal law must be determined by reference to
the 'well-pleaded complaint."' (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983))).
59 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
60 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
61 Id.
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there is no "single, precise definition" of federal question juris-
diction, the "vast majority" of cases that come within a federal
court's jurisdiction are those in which federal law creates the
claim.62 Additionally, a case may arise under federal law "where
the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn [s] on
some construction of federal law."6 The courts, however, have
applied this latter rule cautiously to ensure that only those cases
involving a substantial "controversy respecting the validity, con-
struction, or effect" of federal law receive federal question
jurisdiction.64
Claims filed in state court may be removed if they could have
been filed originally in federal court.65 To determine this, the
court must "examin [e] the complaint as it existed at the time of
removal. ' 66 When the determination is made, "[a] s a general
rule, absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will not be removable if
the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim. "67
"'[B]ecause they implicate federalism concerns, removal stat-
utes are to be narrowly construed' with all doubts resolved
against federal jurisdiction." 6 "Any doubt regarding jurisdic-
62 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8-9. Although there is no precise definition of
what combination of facts and claims constitutes "arising under," Justice
Holmes's statement that "'[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action"' is perhaps as precise as we may hope to achieve. Id. (quoting Am. Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)).
63 Id. at 9.
64 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936) ("'A suit to enforce a
right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or
for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise
unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the
validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which
the result depends."' (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912))).
65 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act
of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.").
66 Harper v. AutoAlliance Int'l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004).
67 Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (holding that "an
action filed in state court to recover damages from a national bank for allegedly
charging excessive interest in violation of both 'the common law usury doctrine'
and an Alabama usury statute may be removed to a federal court because it actu-
ally arises under federal law").
68 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 486 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644
(E.D. Ky. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc.,
201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) ("The power reserved to the states under the Consti-
tution to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be
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tion should be resolved in favor of the states, and the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction falls on the party seeking re-
moval."69 And, because a defendant may remove a case only if
the plaintiffs claims could have been brought in federal court
in the first place, whether a case is removable must be decided,
as discussed above, using the well-pleaded complaint rule.w"
1. The Complete Preemption Doctrine
There are two narrow exceptions to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule, one discussed in this part and the other discussed in
Part II.D.2. The first exception, known as the "complete pre-
emption doctrine, '71 arises when federal law completely
preempts the plaintiff's state law claims. 72 "On occasion, the
Court has concluded that the pre-emptive force of a statute is so
'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordinary state common-law
complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule."' 73 "Once an area of state law has
been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on
that . . . law is considered . . . a federal claim, and therefore
arises under federal law.7" Complete preemption recognizes
that "Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area
that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is nec-
essarily federal in character. 7 5
restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to theJudiciary Articles of
the Constitution. 'Due regard for the rightful independence of state govern-
ments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously con-
fine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined."'
(quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934))).
69 Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted).
70 See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
71 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
72 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
The Court held that "Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to
hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-
pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action
or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a sub-
stantial question of federal law." Id. at 27-28.
73 Caterpillar Inc., 481 U.S. at 393 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 65 (1987)).
74 Id. at 393 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24). Franchise Tax Board stated
"[I]f a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action any
complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily
,arises under' federal law." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24.
75 Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-64.
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Very few statutes meet this standard. Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA),7 6 section 502(A) of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA) 77 and section 30 of the National Bank Act 78 are the only
three preemption provisions that have been interpreted to pre-
empt completely efforts to assert in state court claims arising
from them.79 Courts are reticent to find complete preemption
because doing so essentially nullifies the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 80 Rather than looking only to the complaint for federal
issues, in complete preemption cases the court must also look to
the answering party's anticipated defenses to see whether the
claims arise under federal law.8"
2. Grable Preemption
The second exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is
found where a state law claim raises a substantial question of
federal law.82 This is often called "Grable preemption," named
for the Supreme Court's decision in Grable & Sons Metal Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. In Grable, the
IRS seized part of Grable's land to secure payment of back
taxes.8 Although the agency gave Grable notice of its intent to
sell the property, Grable did not request a hearing in response
to the notice, so the IRS sold the land and applied the proceeds
to what it said Grable owed.84 Grable did not try to redeem the
property within the statutory 180 days after the sale.85 Not until
years later did Grable finally object, filing a state law quiet-title
action and contending that he was still the owner of the prop-
erty because the IRS's notice did not comply with a federal stat-
76 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).
77 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
78 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (2006).
79 Roddy v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Inc., 395 F.3d 318, 323 (6th Cir. 2005). In
addition, "the Price-Anderson Act contains an unusual pre-emption provision, 42
U.S.C. § 2014(hh), that not only gives federal courts jurisdiction over tort actions
arising out of nuclear accidents but also expressly provides for removal of such
actions brought in state court even when they assert only state-law claims." Bene-
ficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (citation omitted).
80 Roddy, 395 F.3d at 323.
81 See id. at 323-24.
82 See generally Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545
U.S. 308 (2005).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 310-11.
85 Id. at 310.
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ute.86 Thus, the only contested issue in his case was one of
federal law-whether the notice was sufficient.8 7 "[T]he main
effect of [this] if Grable should prevail would be to require the
federal government to reimburse the parcel's buyer, disgorging
money that had been credited as taxes. 's8
The Supreme Court reasoned that Grable's claim arose under
federal law because, apart from the form of the cause of ac-
tion-a quiet title action-the claim was based only on federal
law.8" Whether Grable had been given legal notice was, obvi-
ously, essential to his claim.9 0 In fact, how the federal notice
statute should have been applied was the only legal or factual
issue contested.9" Moreover, the outcome of that issue had the
potential to have an impact on the federal government in the
form of reduced tax revenues.12 "The Government thus ha[d] a
direct interest in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate
its own administrative action, and [foreclosure sale] buyers (as
well as tax delinquents) may find it valuable to come before
judges used to federal tax matters. '' 3 Finally, because quiet title
actions in which a federal tax issue arises are relatively rare, ex-
ercising federal jurisdiction over such cases would have "only a
microscopic effect" on the division of labor between federal and
state courts. 4 Under these limited circumstances-a federal
agency's performing duties under federal law affecting federal
tax revenues-the Court concluded that removal to a federal
forum had been appropriate."
Both of these exceptions have been asserted in aviation safety
litigation but with limited success, as the following discussion
will show.
3. Complete Preemption Applied: In re Air Crash at Lexington,
Kentucky, August 27, 2006
The federal district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
considered and rejected applying complete preemption in In re
86 Id. at 311.
87 Id. at 315.
88 Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2007).
89 Grable, 545 U.S. at 314-15.





95 See id. at 311-12.
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Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 200696 These consol-
idated cases were brought by the families and representatives of
the passengers who died in the Comair 5191 accident in August
2006 in Lexington, Kentucky.97 The plaintiffs filed their cases
against various Comair corporate entities (collectively Comair)
in Kentucky state court.98 Comair removed the cases to federal
court, asserting that the plaintiffs' claims for damages arose
under federal law, specifically the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.9'
Plaintiffs moved to remand the cases to state court, and the
federal court granted the motion. 00 The court found that
" [t] he critical issue before [it was] whether there [was] original
federal question jurisdiction to support the removal . .. from
state court."' 01 If Comair failed to prove that federal question
jurisdiction existed on the face of plaintiffs' well-pleaded com-
plaint, then the cases would be remanded to state court to de-
cide all issues, including the standard of care applicable to
plaintiffs' tort-based claims.'012
Comair argued that the FAA completely preempts the field of
aviation safety, and therefore any claims implicating or "arising
under" the Act would create federal jurisdiction.' Comair's
framing the argument in this way-and perhaps arguing more
than it ought-allowed the court to reject the argument by ap-
plying the narrow concept of "complete preemption." ''"4
The court was careful to point out, however, that it is not
enough to find that a federal law preempts state law and from
96 See In reAir Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 486 F. Supp. 2d 640, 657
(E.D. Ky. 2007).
97 Id. at 642.
98 Id.
99 Id. In its answer, Comair asserted, "The Plaintiffs action is one in which this
Court has original jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337] and one which
can be removed to this Court by Comair pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1441], in that
the Plaintiffs right to institute a claim for monetary damages arises under federal
law which, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, . . . P[ub.] L. 85-726, 72
Stat. 731, formerly codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., now recodified and incor-
porated into 49 U.S.C. § 40101, et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der, implicitly preempts state law standards governing aviation safety, flight
operations, takeoff procedures, and flight crew procedures, which Plaintiff al-
leges Comair to have violated." Id. at 642-43.
100 Id. at 642.
101 Id. at 647.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 643-44.
104 See id. at 648.
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that to infer the preemption to be "complete," thus making the
case removable.1 0 5 Rather, the court acknowledged, "it is only
when the federal statutory language demonstrates that Congress
has manifested a clear intent that claims not only be preempted
under the federal law, but also that they be removable, that they
are deemed to be completely preempted." 106 "In other words,
the complete preemption doctrine is not simply one of preemp-
tion of the law, it is a sort of 'super' preemption which preempts
not only state law, but also creates federal removal jurisdiction-
to use the jargon of the day, it is 'preemption on steroids.'" 0 7
But the court also noted a need for caution: "'Complete pre-
emption represents a substantial departure from the firmly es-
tablished well-pleaded complaint rule. This Court is hesitant to
find such a departure absent clear Congressional intent to that
effect."' 108 With this in mind, the court examined the text and
legislative history of the FAA and ADA and found "no evidence
that Congress intended the federal courts to have exclusive sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the preemption defenses to state
law claims against air carriers."'0 9 Accordingly, Comair's de-
fenses would not support removal jurisdiction.1 0
4. Grable Preemption Applied: Bennett v. Southwest Airlines
Bennett v. Southwest Airlines arose in December 2005, when a
Southwest Boeing 737-700 landed long and downwind on Run-
way 31C during a snowstorm at Chicago's Midway Airport.''
These circumstances, together with the crew's delay in de-
ploying thrust reversers during rollout, caused the airplane to
over-run the runway and careen through a barrier and fence.'
12
Before coming to rest, the plane collided with a car, killing one
105 Id. at 649 (discussing Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 552-53
(6th Cir. 2006) ("'Erisa pre-emption, without more, does not convert a state
claim into an action arising under federal law."').
106 Id. (quoting Palkow, 431 F.3d at 552-53 (citation omitted)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
107 Palkow, 431 F.3d at 553.
108 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (quoting Roddy v.
Grand Trunk W. R.R. Inc., 395 F.3d 318, 326 (6th Cir. 2005)).
109 Id. (quoting Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244,
1253 (6th Cir. 1996)).
110 Id. at 653-54.
111 Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 908 (7th Cir. 2007).
112 Id.
3472011]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
of the occupants, and injuring twelve others on the ground.'13
No one onboard the plane was hurt.' 1 4
The family of Mariko Bennett filed suit in Illinois state court,
alleging that the negligence of Southwest, Boeing, and the City
of Chicago (which owns and operates Midway) caused the acci-
dent."5 The defendants removed the case to federal court on
the theory that plaintiffs' claims arose under federal law." 6 The
district court denied plaintiffs' motion to remand, then certified
its decision for interlocutory appeal, which the Seventh Circuit
accepted.1 7 The appeals court framed the issue this way: "We
must decide whether plaintiffs' claims arise under federal law
because federal aviation standards play a major role in a claim
that Southwest (as operator of the flight), Boeing (as manufac-
turer of the airframe), or Chicago (as operator of the airport)
acted negligently."1"8
On appeal, the defendants argued that under Grable, claims
nominally based on state law may, under certain circumstances,
"arise under" federal law. 19 From this premise, they argued fur-
ther that Grable permitted removing the case under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a), because the complaint "'necessarily raise[s] a stated
federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally ap-
proved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.' "120
The defendants maintained that the Grable rule "is satisfied for
aviation accidents because of the dominant role that federal law




116 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a) (2006).
117 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 908; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
11s Bennett, 484 F.3d at at 908.
'1 See id. at 909.
Federal-question jurisdiction is usually invoked by plaintiffs plead-
ing a cause of action created by federal law, but this Court has also
long recognized that such jurisdiction will lie over some state-law
claims that implicate significant federal issues. Such federal juris-
diction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substan-
tial one. And the jurisdiction must be consistent with congressional
judgment about the sound division of labor between state and fed-
eral courts governing § 1331's application.
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 308 (2005)
(citation omitted).
120 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 909.
121 Id.
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The Seventh Circuit rejected each of these arguments and re-
manded the case to state court.122 To begin with, the court
noted that the parties agreed Illinois tort law was the source of
plaintiffs' claims for relief.123 Adopting Justice Holmes's logic
that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of ac-
tion, ' 1 2 4 the court reasoned that if Illinois law was the basis for
the claims, Illinois law must also "create[ ] the cause of ac-
tion.1125 Completing its three-part syllogism, the court con-
cluded that if the source of plaintiffs' claims was Illinois law, and
the claims were therefore created by Illinois law, then the claims
also arose under Illinois law, not federal law.126 The court was
quick to reject defendants' suggestion that applying a federal
standard of care to otherwise state law based claims would alter
this result, noting "[t] hat [because] some standards of care used
in tort litigation come from federal law does not make the tort
claim one 'arising under' federal law."1
27
Second, the court noted that history and precedent also
weighed against removal because "[f]or decades aviation suits
have been litigated in state court when the parties were not of
diverse citizenship."'12 The court specifically rejected the de-
fendants' argument that Grable supported removal jurisdiction,
finding that the circumstances in Grable were "'poles apart'
from those arising from the Midway accident.129 Southwest,
Boeing, and City argued that "all suits about commercial air
travel belong in federal court because the national government
is the principal source of rules about safe air transportation, and
uniform application of these norms is desirable.' 13° The court
concluded, however, that they could not plausibly suggest "that
122 Id. at 912.
123 Id. at 908.
124 Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
("What makes the defendants' act a wrong is its manifest tendency to injure the
plaintiff's business; and the wrong is the same whatever the means by which it is
accomplished. But whether it is a wrong or not depends upon the law of the state
where the act is done, not upon the patent law, and therefore the suit arises
under the law of the state. A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action.").
125 See Bennett, 484 F.3d at 908-09, 912 (citing Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at
260).
126 Id. at 912.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 909.
129 Id. at 910 (citation omitted).
130 Id. at 909.
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resolution of [the] suit revolves around any particular disputed
issue of federal law."' 3 1
To demonstrate this, the court outlined the "fact-bound ques-
tion [s]" the trial court would have to address to decide whether
any of the defendants were negligent: the length of the active
runway, its condition because of the snowstorm, the approach
routing of the flight to avoid conflicting traffic at O'Hare, and
the inability of the city to acquire land around Midway to
lengthen the airport's runways.3 2 The court concluded that
"[t]he particulars of Flight 1248's landing may never recur; a
search for a 'uniform federal rule,"' which defendants had said
compelled federal jurisdiction, "would be a hunt for a will-o'-
the-wisp. "133 On this basis, the court ordered that the case be
remanded to state court.1 3 4
III. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PREEMPTION
PROVISIONS
Before further addressing how the principles discussed in Part
I come into play in aviation safety litigation, we must first ad-
dress three Supreme Court preemption decisions stemming
from truck and auto safety litigation, which-along with
pharmaceuticals-have been at the forefront of recent products
liability preemption cases before the Supreme Court.13 These
cases are important because they clarify important issues about
how express and implied preemption interact and how the pre-
emption provisions commonly found in federal laws may affect
the way courts analyze their preemptive effect.
The first case, Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, held that courts may
analyze a federal statute or regulation on implied preemption
grounds even though Congress included an express preemption
provision.'36 The second, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
held that a saving clause in a federal statute should not prevent
courts from considering implied preemption principles in evalu-
ating the impact of federal auto safety standards. 37 Although
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 912.
134 Id.
135 For additional reading on the current state of federal preemption of state
law standards of care, see MARc S. MOLLER, PREEMPTION (2010) (unpublished)
(on file with the authors).
136 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995).
137 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867-68 (2000).
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the facts of the third case, Williamson v. Mazda Motor Corp. of
America, Inc., were very similar to Geier, they yielded a completely
different outcome on the preemption issue.13 Although de-
cided outside the context of aviation litigation, these cases are
nonetheless at the center of recent aviation preemption cases,
including the three cases we discuss in Part IV. We hope that an
overview of Freightliner, Geier, and Williamson here will serve as a
useful preface to the later discussion.
A. FREIGHTLINER CORP. v. MYRICK
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick arose from two separate accidents in
Georgia involving 18-wheel tractor-trailers.1"9 The plaintiffs
sued the truck manufacturers in state court under state tort law,
alleging the trucks were negligently designed because they were
not equipped with antilock brakes. 40 The manufacturers re-
moved the cases to federal court based on diversity of citizen-
ship. 41 They then moved for summary judgment, arguing
plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act). 4 2 The district
court held that the Safety Act preempted Myrick's negligent de-
sign claims and granted summary judgment to Freightliner. 43
On appeal, the two cases were consolidated then reversed by
the Eleventh Circuit, 44 which held that "the state-law tort claims
were not expressly pre-empted;" the court rejected the manufac-
turers' contention that the claims were preempted because of a
conflict between state law and the federal regulations under the
Safety Act.145 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and af-
firmed the Court of Appeals. 146
At the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs (there respondents) ar-
gued that the Court need not address implied conflict preemp-
138 SeeWilliamson v. Mazda Motor Corp. of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139-40
(2011).
139 Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 282.
140 Id. at 283.
141 Id.
142 Id. (citing Nat'l Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420) (re-
pealed 1994)).
143 Id. (citing Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1139 (N.D. Ga. 1992),
rev'd, 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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tion at all.147 Relying on Cipollone,148 they argued that "implied
pre-emption cannot exist when Congress has chosen to include
an express pre-emption clause in a statute,"'49 suggesting what
the Court called "'a variant of the familiar principle of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.'",o The Court rejected this argument,
explaining that Cipollone had not created "a categorical rule pre-
cluding the coexistence of express and implied pre-emption.'
'1 51
"In our opinion, the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act and the
1969 Act is governed entirely by the express language in § 5 of
each Act. When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emp-
tion and has included in the enacted legislation a provision ex-
plicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a
'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-
empt state laws from the substantive provisions' of the
legislation. 152
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in Freightliner, cautioned
that Cipollone does not say that the presence of an express pre-
emption provision necessarily precludes conducting an implied
preemption analysis.' 5
The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a
statute "implies"-i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that Con-
gress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean
that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of im-
plied pre-emption .... At best, Cipollone supports an inference
that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emp-
tion; it does not establish a rule.' 54
Finally, Justice Thomas, perhaps foreshadowing the Court's
next major preemption case in the products liability area, de-
clined to address plaintiffs' argument that the Safety Act's saving
clause 155 precluded the manufacturers from using the federal
147 See id. at 287.
148 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) ("Such reasoning
is a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alteri.us. Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.").
149 Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 287.
150 Id. at 288 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
151 Id.
152 Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
15 Id. at 288-89.
154 Id.
155 The Safety Act's saving clause provided that "[c]ompliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any
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safety standard to immunize themselves from state common-law
liability." 6 Instead, that specific question was addressed five
years later in Geier.57
B. GEIER V. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR Co.
Alexis Geier was badly injured when she drove her Honda Ac-
cord into a tree.1 58 The car was equipped with manual shoulder
and lap belts, both of which she had buckled.1 59 She and her
parents sued Honda under District of Columbia tort law,
"claim [ing], among other things, that American Honda had de-
signed its car negligently and defectively because it lacked a
driver's side airbag."l60 The district court dismissed the suit on
preemption grounds, holding that the Safety Act, and more par-
ticularly, the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)
promulgated by the Department of Transportation under the
person from any liability under common law." National Traffic & Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 108(c), 80 Stat. 718, 723 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)) (repealed 1994).
156 Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 287 n.3.
157 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867-68 (2000); see also Altria
Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 75 (2008) ("If a federal law contains an express
pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question
of the substance and scope of Congress' [s] displacement of state law still remains.
Pre-emptive intent may also be inferred if the scope of the statute indicates that
Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field, or if there is an
actual conflict between state and federal law.") Some courts have read Geier nar-
rowly, holding that it only applies in conflict preemption cases, and thus leaves
open whether a saving clause forecloses implied field preemption analysis. See,
e.g., Hart v. Boeing Co., No. 09-cv-00397, 2009 WL 4250122, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov.
23, 2009) ("Given that Geier clearly confined its analysis for conflict preemption, I
cannot say that this vague dicta is sufficient to overcome the precedent of Cleve-
land."); Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. Civ. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL 1084103,
at *21 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006) (noting that Geier involved conflict preemption, not
field preemption, but that Geier states Congress' adoption of a saving clause does
not limit application of ordinary implied preemption principles); Monroe v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that Geier
limited the standard from Cipollone that implied preemption is not generally ap-
plicable to statutes that contain express preemption clauses and does not apply to
cases where implied conflict preemption exists, although it still applies to the
implied field preemption analysis). But see Choate v. Champion Home Builders
Co., 222 F.3d 788, 794 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The presence of a saving clause such as
the one in the Manufactured Housing Act also does not, by itself, foreclose an
implied preemption analysis."). The Choate decision is especially relevant to the
Tenth Circuit's later holding in US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell. US Airways, Inc. v.
O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326 (10th Cir. 2010); see also infra Section IV.C.
158 Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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Safety Act, gave car manufacturers a choice of whether to install
airbags.161 The district court found that Ms. Geier's lawsuit, "be-
cause it sought to establish a different safety standard-i.e., an
airbag requirement-was expressly pre-empted. 1 62
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with
the lower court's conclusion, but found Ms. Geier's claim pre-
empted for different reasons. 163 Rather than hold that the
Safety Act expressly preempted her claim, the court of appeals
reasoned that Ms. Geier's state law tort claims "posed an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment of [the] FMVSS['s] ... objectives. 164
For that reason, the court concluded that her state law claims
conflicted with the FMVSS and therefore were impliedly pre-
empted. 165 Despite its differing reasons for finding preemption,
the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the district court's
dismissal. 166
The Supreme Court also affirmed the dismissal.16 v After sur-
veying state and federal appellate decisions in "no airbag" cases
and finding a consensus that such claims were preempted-ei-
ther under the Safety Act's express preemption provision or by
implied conflict preemption-the Court concluded that Ms.
Geier's claims conflicted with the objectives of the FMVSS and
were therefore preempted by the Safety Act. 168 The Court said
it reached its decision by answering "three subsidiary ques-
tions. ' 169 "First, [did] the [Safety] Act's express pre-emption




164 Id. at 866.
165 Id.
166 Id. The court's decision suggests two ancillary points: first, each type of
federal preemption, however it may be described, has the same preemptive effect
as the others; and second, any one type is sufficient to preempt a state-law claim.
167 Id.
168 Id. The court found that all of the courts of appeal that had considered the
question had found preemption. Id. One decision relied on the Safety Act's
express preemption provision. See, e.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410,
1413-15 (9th Cir. 1997). Others found preemption under ordinary preemption
principles, i.e., conflicts with the objectives of the FMVSS, and thus with the
Safety Act itself. See, e.g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1417 (10th
Cir. 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1121-25 (3d Cir. 1990);
Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 825-27 (11th Cir. 1989); Wood v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 412-14 (1st Cir. 1988).
169 Geier, 529 U.S. at 867.
170 Id.
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not.'71 Second, did ordinary preemption principles apply, even
though the Safety Act has an express preemption provision?
17 2
The Court held that they did. 173 Finally, the Court asked
whether Ms. Geier's lawsuit actually conflicted with the FMVSS
and thus the Safety Act itself.174 The Court held that it did. 1 75
The first of these three questions is most relevant here.
Honda argued that "safety standard," as used in the Safety Act's
express preemption provision, was similar to the word "require-
ments" used in the preemption clause of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA). 176 The Supreme Court had con-
sidered the MDA preemption clause in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
and found that it preempted state law tort claims. 177 Honda rea-
soned that, because the Court found the MDA clause pre-
empted state-law claims, and because the Safety Act's "safety
standard" was synonymous with the MDA's "requirement," the
Court should find the Safety Act likewise to preempt state law
tort claims.' 78 The Geiers, on the other hand, argued that the
Safety Act refers to "pre-empting a state-law safety standard, not a
'requirement,' and that a tort action does not involve a safety
standard."179
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer declined to resolve
this issue.180 Rather than parse the (perhaps illusory) distinc-
tions between "standard" and "requirement," he opted to rely
on the Safety Act's saving clause to support the Court's conclu-




173 Id. This had been answered affirmatively in Freightliner. See discussion supra
Part II.C. and text accompanying notes 139-157.
174 Geier, 529 U.S. at 867.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502-04 (1996); see supra note 4 and
accompanying text; see also Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
295, § 521, 90 Stat. 539, 574 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)). The
preemption provision of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 provides:
"[N]o State ... may establish ... with respect to a device ... any [state] require-
ment ... which is different from, or in addition to, any [federal] requirement
.... Id. (emphasis added).
178 Geier, 529 U.S. at 867.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 867-68.
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We need not determine the precise significance of the use of the
word "standard," rather than "requirement," however, for the
[Safety] Act contains another provision, which resolves the disa-
greement. That provision, a "saving" clause, says that
"[c] ompliance with" a federal safety standard "does not exempt
any person from any liability under common law." "The saving
clause assumes that there are some significant number of com-
mon-law liability cases to save.
1 8 2
In other words, had Congress not included a saving clause in
the Safety Act, then a broad reading of the express preemption
provision would make sense-there would be nothing in the
statute to suggest that Congress intended to "save" state law ac-
tions from preemption.1 8 3 But, because Congress included a
saving clause, the Court found it reasonable to infer that Con-
gress also anticipated that at least some cases based on state law
would be "saved."'8 4 Had it intended otherwise-that is, had it
intended to preempt all state law cases by enacting the Safety
Act-it would have had no reason to include a saving clause.
The preemption clause itself would have been sufficient to pre-
empt all such cases without exception. Although Justice
Breyer's opinion does not say so explicitly, any differing conclu-
sion would make the saving clause superfluous, violating the
rule that courts should, if possible, interpret statutes to give ef-
fect to every word and clause.'8 5
Having decided "that the saving clause at least removes tort
actions from the scope of the express pre-emption clause," the
Court then asked, "Does it do more?"'186 "[D]oes [the saving
clause] foreclose or limit the operation of ordinary pre-emption
principles"-that is, implied preemption? 8 7 Although Freightliner
held that an express preemption provision did not foreclose im-
plied conflict preemption analysis, it did not address whether
the saving clause in the Safety Act prevents a manufacturer from
using a federal standard to avoid state common law liability. 88
182 Id.
183 Id. at 868.
184 Id.
185 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990) (holding defendant's
construction of criminal statute "violates the established principle that a court
should 'give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."' (quoting
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955))).
186 Geier, 529 U.S. at 869.
187 Id.
188 Id. ("declining to address whether the saving clause prevents a manufac-
turer from 'us[ing] a federal safety standard to immunize itself from state corn-
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To fill that narrow gap in the Court's preemption decisions, the
Court took up the issue and concluded "that the saving clause
(like the express pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordi-
nary working of conflict pre-emption principles." '189
The Court based its conclusion on three closely related
points. First, the Court noted that "[nl othing in the language
of the saving clause suggests an intent to save state-law tort ac-
tions that conflict with federal regulations."1 90 Just as the saving
clause should not be read to be ineffectual and save no state law
cases, neither should it be read to save all such cases and thus
nullify whatever preemptive effect the federal statute or regula-
tion might have. 9 ' Relying on the Restatement (Third) of Torts to
distinguish between the two types of defenses, the Court said the
language of the saving clause "sound [s] as if [it] simply bar [s] a
special kind of defense, namely, a defense that compliance with
a federal standard automatically exempts a defendant from state
law. 1 9 2 The saving clause was not intended to "save" all state law
tort claims, only those that were not otherwise expressly or im-
pliedly preempted.193
Second, consistent with its repeated refusal to read saving
clauses broadly, the Court found that "the saving clause foresees
- it does not foreclose - the possibility that a federal safety stan-
dard will pre-empt a state common-law tort action with which it
conflicts."' 94
Finally, and perhaps anticipating Justice Stevens' dissent, Jus-
tice Breyer noted that the presence of a preemption provision, a
saving clause, or both, does not create a "special burden" on the
party advocating preemption "beyond that [which is] inherent
in ordinary pre-emption principles."' 95 Read together, a pre-
emption provision and a saving clause in the same statute "re-
mon-law liability"' (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 n.3
(1995))); see supra note 149 and accompanying text.
189 Gejer, 529 U.S. at 869.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 867-68 ("The saving clause assumes that there are some significant
number of common-law liability cases to save.").
192 Id. at 869-70 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 4(b) cmt. e (1997) (distinguishing between state-law compliance defense and a
federal claim of pre-emption)).
193 Id. at 870.
194 Id. ("[T]his Court has repeatedly 'decline [d] to give broad effect to saving
clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by
federal law."' (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000))).
195 Id. (citation omitted).
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flect a neutral policy, not a specially favorable or unfavorable
policy, toward the application of ordinary conflict pre-emption
principles.' 1 96 Thus, simply because a body of law contains ex-
press preemption language as to some areas does not necessarily
foreclose the possibility that Congress intended to preempt im-
pliedly other areas of the law.
To summarize, Freightliner holds that the presence of an ex-
press preemption provision in a statute or regulation does not
foreclose the possibility that the statute or regulation may also
impliedly preempt a state law claim, either because the federal
law occupies the field or because the state law claim conflicts
with the federal law. 197 Geier, on the other hand, holds that the
presence of a saving clause does not allow for an expansive read-
ing of the law's express preemption provision, but also does not
foreclose the possibility that state law claims are nonetheless im-
pliedly preempted. 19
8
C. WILLIAMSON V. MAZDA MOTOR CoRP. OF AMERICA
On February 23, 2011, the Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Williamson v. Mazda Motor Corp. of America, Inc.'99 Although
Williamson does not mark a major shift in the Supreme Court's
preemption analysis, the case is noteworthy because, based on
facts very similar to those discussed above in Geier, the Court
came to precisely the opposite conclusion on the issue of federal
preemption. 20 0 This immediately puts in issue, of course, how
the facts in Williamson were different enough to yield a differ-
ent outcome.
The facts of the case are simple. In 2002, the Williamson fam-
ily, while traveling in their Mazda minivan, was involved in a
head-on collision. 20 1 Their daughter, Thahn, who was sitting in
the rear aisle seat wearing a lap belt, was killed.20 2 The William-
sons' two other children, who were wearing lap-and-shoulder
belts, survived the collision. 2 3 The Williamsons sued Mazda in
California state court, claiming that Mazda should have installed
a shoulder belt for the rear aisle seat in which Thahn had been
196 Id. at 870-71.
197 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995).
198 Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
199 Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
200 See id. at 1137-40.
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seated and that the company's failure to do so created a defect
that caused her death.2
0 4
The trial court dismissed the case on the pleadings, and the
California Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that applying a
shoulder-and-lap-belt-only requirement would deprive minivan
manufacturers of the choice-allowed by the then-current ver-
sion of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208-between in-
stalling lap belts only or shoulder-and-lap belt combinations for
the rear aisle seat.20 5 The court of appeals concluded that the
federal regulation preempted the state tort suit.20 6
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "in light of the
fact that several courts have interpreted Geier as indicating that
FMVSS 208 pre-empts state tort suits claiming that manufactur-
ers should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts, not lap belts,
on rear inner seats. '20 7 Writing for a 7-1 majority, Justice
Breyer noted at the outset of the majority opinion the close
similarities between Williamson and Geier.2 °9
We turn now to the present case. Like the regulation in Geier,
the regulation here leaves the manufacturer with a choice. And,
like the tort suit in Geier, the tort suit here would restrict that
choice. But unlike Geier, we do not believe here that choice is a
significant regulatory objective. 0
Notwithstanding the ultimate outcome of the Court's decision
on preemption, Williamson confirms the soundness of Geier's
three-part preemption analysis. Applying that analysis to slightly
different facts, however, led to the opposite result.211 As it did in
Geier, the Court asked first whether the National Traffic and Mo-
tor Vehicle Safety Act's (NTMVSA) express preemption clause
preempted the Williamsons' claim.212 The Court found that it
did not.213 Second, the Court asked whether ordinary tort prin-




207 Id. at 1135 (citations omitted).
208 Id. at 1133. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case. Id. Justice Breyer also wrote for the 5-4 majority in Geier. Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 863 (2000).
209 Williamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1135.
210 Id. at 1137.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 1135-36 (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 867-69).
213 Id. at 1136.
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emption clause. 21 4 The Court found that they do apply.215
Finally, the Court asked whether the Williamsons' state tort ac-
tion actually conflicted with the FMVSS and Safety Act itself.21 6
Unlike in Geier, the Court found that it did not.217
The Court reasoned that, unlike the choice between airbags
and seatbelts in Geier, "providing manufacturers with [a] seatbelt
choice [between lap belts and shoulder-lap belts] is not a signifi-
cant objective of the federal regulation. '218 Thus, California tort
law did not impede the federal law's objective.21 9 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court reviewed the FMVSS's regulatory his-
tory, the Department of Transportation's reasoning for allowing
manufacturers a choice between lap belts and shoulder-and-lap
belt combinations, and the Solicitor General's amicus brief on
the issue.220 Although the history of the regulation was similar
to what the Court considered in Geier,2 the Court found that
the agency's objectives behind the newer version of the regula-
tion differed.2 2 2 In Geier, the Court found that the underlying
policy objective of allowing car-makers to offer a variety of pas-
sive restraints was to encourage consumers to become familiar
with and use them.223 In Williamson, on the other hand, the
Court found that the agency's regulation did not require lap-
and-shoulder belts in certain rear seat configurations mainly be-
cause of the perceived added costs to manufacturers, among
other factors. 224 That objective-making passive restraints more
economical-was not sufficient to show that the DOT intended
to bar states from imposing more stringent standards through
common law tort actions. 2 25 And, unlike in Geier, the Solicitor
General's office had submitted a brief saying that the applicable
regulation did not preempt the Williamson family's claims.226
Williamson likely will not have a significant impact on federal




217 Id. at 1136-37.
218 Id. at 1134.
219 Id. at 1139-40.
220 Id. at 1137-39.
221 Id. at 1137-38.
222 Id.
223 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 879-81 (2000).
224 Williamson, 562 U.S. at 1138-39.
225 Id. at 1139.
226 Id.
360
STANDARD OF CARE PREEMPTION
case appears to be confined to passive-restraint defect cases
against auto manufacturers. Geier remains good law. Williamson
does suggest, however, that the Court may be increasingly will-
ing-as Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissenting opinion-
to wade "into a sea of agency musings and Government litigat-
ing positions and fish[ ] for what the agency may have been
thinking 20 years ago when it drafted the relevant provision. '"227
If Justice Thomas is correct, then practitioners increasingly may
have to look past statutory language (the supposed lodestar of
Congress's intent), and instead parse finer and finer traces of
administrative policy objectives to make their case for or against
federal preemption. This, in turn, will lead to less certainty,
more risk, and an added burden on already-burdened litigants
for whom the choice between state or federal law is an impor-
tant one.
IV. FEDERAL AVIATION LEGISLATION 228
Not long after Congress passed and President Eisenhower
signed the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA or Act), the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit said the Act "was passed by
Congress for the purpose of centralizing in a single authority -
indeed, in one administrator - the power to frame rules for the
safe and efficient use of the nation's airspace. 2 29 By enacting
the FAA, "Congress's consolidation of control of aviation in one
agency indicated its intent to federally preempt aviation
safety.'23' Later decisions by U.S. courts of appeals said, how-
ever, that the Supreme Court's conclusion about the FAA does
not mean aviation-related negligence claims are themselves pre-
empted; rather, only the standard of care applied in deciding
227 Id. at 1142 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228 In addition to the Federal Aviation Act and the Airline Deregulation Act,
discussed infra, Congress codified the Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705
(2006), and the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), Pub. L. No.
103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-102, § 3(e), 111 Stat.
2215 (1997) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (1997)). GARA established,
among other things, an eighteen year statute of repose for product liability claims
against general aviation manufacturers. GARA § 3. A detailed analysis of GARA
is beyond the scope of this paper, however. For additional reading, see John D.
McClune, There Is No Complete, Implied, or Field Federal Preemption of State Law
Personal Injury/Wrongful Death Negligence or Product Liability Claims in General
Aviation Cases, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 717, 723 (2006); see also infra text
accompanying notes 391-392.
229 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960).
230 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Bur-
bank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973)).
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those claims is preempted.2 3' Other courts of appeals have dis-
counted (or ignored) this distinction and have held that the
FAA does not preempt either the standard of care or aviation-
related negligence claims as a whole.232 To add to this uncer-
tainty, other courts have applied federal preemption to claims
arising under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) and
the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), also with differing and some-
times contradictory results.233
Given the differing interpretations of federal legislation and
their interplay with state law claims, a review of the applicable
federal legislation is warranted.
A. THE FEDERAL AvIATION ACT OF 1958 AND ITS PRECURSORS
Not long after Clyde Cessna, Walter Beech, and other pio-
neers of civil aviation started building airplanes, the federal gov-
ernment began to impose regulatory control over interstate air
transportation and commerce. 23 '4 As Justice Jackson noted
somewhat later, "Federal control is intensive and exclusive.
Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They
move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection,
in the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intri-
cate system of federal commands. ' 235
Federal regulation of aviation began in 1926 with the Air
Commerce Act (1926 Act),236 which empowered the Secretary of
Commerce to regulate the "full particulars of the design [of air-
craft] and of the calculations upon which the design is based
and the materials and methods used in the construction. 2 37
The 1926 Act left regulation of intrastate flying to the states, but
Congress urged them to adopt "uniform laws and regulations
231 Michael Holland, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Preemption in the Field
of Air, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 11, 18-24 (2011).
232 Id. at 26-27.
233 Eric E. Murphy, Comment, Federal Preemption of State Law Relating to an Air
Carrier's Services, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 1197, 1197-99 (2004).
234 The relatively short period between the advent of commercially viable air-
plane manufacturing and the imposition of federal regulation on air commerce
suggests that the states may have had little, if any, opportunity to enact a compet-
ing set of air safety laws and regulations. See TIM BRODY, THE AMERICAN AVIATION
EXPERIENCE: A HISTORy 158-75 (2000).
235 Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
236 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926)
(amended 1938).
237 Id. § 15.
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corresponding with the provisions of [the 1926 Act] and the
rules and regulations that will be promulgated under it. '238
Prompted by Congress's urging, virtually all the states passed
legislation adopting the federal standards, including the Uni-
form State Air Licensing Act (USALA) .239 The USAIA was
based on the common sense notion that "[i]nasmuch as there
can be but one standard of airworthiness, only a limited range
of piloting ability, and no variation in rules, it would seem obvi-
ous that State laws dealing with regulation should provide re-
quirements identical with those of the Federal law. 240
From the outset, conformity with federal standards has been
the universal principle in civil aviation law. When the federal
government did not police intrastate flight, the states voluntarily
ceded any police power in this area to the federal government.
Federal regulations became more pervasive with the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938,24 1 and culminated in the FAA.242 A Senate
report accompanying the FAA recognized the federal govern-
ment's exclusive role in regulating interstate air travel, saying
"the Federal Government bears virtually complete responsibility
for the promotion and supervision of [the aviation] industry. '243
A key objective in enacting the FAA was to promote airline
safety by establishing comprehensive and uniform federal regu-
lation.244 Congress enacted the FAA "for the purpose of central-
izing in a single authority - [the Federal Aviation
Administration, then called the Federal Aviation Agency] - the
power to frame rules for the safe and efficient use of the na-
tion's airspace. '"245 "The [FAA] requires a delicate balance be-
238 S. REP. No. 69-2, at 8 (1925), reprinted in CIVIL AERONAUTICS: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926 29 (rev. ed. 1943).
239 Uniform Air Licensing Act (1930).
240 Bureau of Air Commerce, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, AERONAUTICAL BULLE-
TIN No. 18, STATE AERONAUTICAL DIGEST AND UNIFORM STATE LAws, at 2 (1936).
241 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 971 (1938).
242 Fed. Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
The acronym "FAA" is typically associated with the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion. For the sake of clarity here, however, we will use "FAA" or "Act" as short-
hand for the Federal Aviation Act of. 1958, and use "Agency" or the full name
"Federal Aviation Administration" or its predecessor, the "Federal Aviation
Agency," when referring to the administrative body.
243 S. REP. No. 85-1811, at 5 (1958).
244 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 102-03.
245 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960); see also
French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)
("[E]stablishment of a single uniform system of regulation in the area of air
safety was one of the primary object[ives] . . . of the Act."); In re Mex. City Air-
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tween safety and efficiency, and the protection of persons on the
ground. . . . The interdependence of these factors requires a
uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if the con-
gressional objectives underlying the [FAA] are to be fulfilled. 246
To further Congress's objective of uniform regulation, the Act
required the newly organized Federal Aviation Agency to pre-
scribe "[s]uch reasonable rules and regulations . .. as the Ad-
ministrator may find necessary to provide adequately for . . .
safety in air commerce. '"247 The Agency, renamed the Federal
Aviation Administration when it became part of the Department
of Transportation in 1967,248 has complied with this directive by
issuing pervasive regulations addressing airline safety, covering
operations both in the air and on the ground.249
The text and legislative history of the Act establish Congress's
intent to regulate aviation safety comprehensively. It granted
the Agency broad authority to ensure aircraft safety,25 ° and
more specifically directs the Agency to prescribe "minimum
standards required in the interest of safety for appliances and
for the design, material, construction, quality of work, and per-
formance of aircraft. 251
In sum, the federal government has sole responsibility for
promulgating rules about aircraft safety. 25 2 Consistent with that
responsibility, the Agency has enacted a comprehensive set of
aviation regulations, found in Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, governing nearly all aspects of aircraft safety-from
crash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding it "beyond
dispute that the [FAA] was enacted.., to promote safety in aviation"); cf. Dilley v.
Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 49 F.3d 667, 668 (10th Cir. 1995) ("The Federal Aviation
Act clearly grants broad disciplinary power to the agency" including suspending a
pilot's certificate.).
246 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39
(1973) (citations omitted); see also id. at 644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The
paramount substantive concerns of Congress [in enacting the FAA] were to regu-
late federally all aspects of air safety.").
247 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 601 (a) (6).
248 Dep't of Transp. Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, §§ 3(e)(1), 6(c)(1), 80 Stat. 931,
932-38 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
249 See, e.g., Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2007);
Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 369 nn. 6-9 (3d Cir. 1999).
250 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103(b), 44701 (2006).
251 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (a)(1).
252 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 369 ("[T]he Act... give [s] '[t]he Administrator of
the new Federal Aviation Agency full responsibility and authority for the advance-
ment and promulgation of civil aeronautics generally, including promulgation
and enforcement of safety regulations."' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85-2360, re-
printed in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N 3741, 3741)).
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airplane design, manufacture, and certification,25 3 to pilot train-
ing and qualifications, 25 4 to the complex set of regulations on
how scheduled airlines must operate.255
B. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
The ADA 256 signaled a starting point on many issues, includ-
ing deregulation of routes and fares.257 Unlike the FAA, the
ADA includes an express preemption clause, which provides "a
State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transporta-
tion under this subpart.'' 258 Congress included that provision in
the ADA "[t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal
deregulation with regulation of their own. '' 59 Congress did not
want the states to fill a regulatory vacuum by enacting conflict-
ing regulations, potentially reducing air carrier competitiveness
and increasing air fares to the public.
The express preemption clause, applicable to "price, route or
service," has been characterized as a "careful and balanced ap-
plication of the statutory standard of preemption. 260 While we
will concede that the clause may be careful and balanced, it is
not free of ambiguity. What constitutes a "price" or a "route"
seems relatively straightforward; however, "service" is another
matter entirely.26 1 Courts have struggled with what Congress in-
253 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 25 (2010).
254 See id. at pt. 61.
255 See id. at pt. 121.
256 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
The acronym "ADA" will be used interchangeably with The Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 throughout.
257 J. David Grizzle, Amanda K. Bruchs, Robert A. Hawks & Lisa A. Holden,
Navigating the Turbulence of Competing Interests: Principles and Practice of the Federal
Aviation Administration, 75J. AIR L. & COM. 777, 778-79 (2010).
258 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006). The original enactment read in part "any
law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision ... relating to rates, routes, or
services of any air carrier having authority . . . to provide air transportation."
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (1978) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41713).
259 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992).
260 Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and the American Federal System, 55 WAYNE
L. REv. 1487, 1518 (2009).
261 Daniel H. Rosenthal, Legal Turbulence: The Court's Misconstrual of the Airline
Deregulation Act's Preemption Clause and the Effect on Passengers' Rights, 51 DuKe L.J.
1857, 1870 (2002) (arguing that "[i]n the Deregulation Act, Congress neither
defined 'services' nor specified the type of state action preempted by the clause.
Consequently, the courts have had to interpret what Congress meant, but they
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tended to include within the term "service," especially when en-
gaging in preemption analysis.262
Because the ADA's express preemption clause relates only to
the price, route, or service of an "air carrier," many argue that it
is not relevant to product liability and negligence claims, at least
those involving general aviation.263 Opponents of standard of
care preemption argue that Congress's inclusion of an express
preemption clause in the ADA signals that it did not intend to
preempt state law with the FAA, also pointing to the FAA's sav-
ing clause. 264 But as seen in Part I.C., supra, the Supreme Court
has held that an express preemption provision does not fore-
close the possibility of implied preemption, nor does a saving
clause foreclose state law claims being impliedly preempted.265
C. THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994
The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA) gen-
erally bars lawsuits against general aviation aircraft manufactur-
ers if eighteen or more years have elapsed between the
manufacture and sale of the aircraft and an accident involving
the aircraft causing death or injury to persons or property.26 6
GARA expressly preempts state law where state law would other-
wise allow such a suit after the eighteen-year statute of repose
has run.2 67 GARA's preemptive effect has generally been limited
to this narrow circumstance, in conformity with its express lan-
guage and legislative history. GARA also created a "rolling stat-
ute of repose ' 268 applicable to replacement parts, including "any
new component, system, subassembly, or other part ... of the
have had difficulty with the Deregulation Act's frustratingly broad language." (ci-
tations omitted)); see also MatthewJ. Kelly, Comment, Federal Preemption by the Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978: How Do State Tort Claims Fare?, 49 CATH. U. L. REv.
873, 874-75 (2000).
262 Rosenthal, supra note 261, at 1871.
263 See, e.g., Michael L. Slack, Overview of Preemption in Aviation Product Liability
Cases (2008), available at http://www.slackdavis.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/
05/preemption-aviationproductjliability.pdf.
264 Id.
265 See discussion supra Part II.C.
266 See generally General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), Pub. L.
No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)).
267 "A statute of limitation is a bar on suits filed more than a specified period of
time-usually 2 years or 3 years-after an injury occurs or is discovered. A statute
of repose, in contrast, is a bar on suits brought more than a specified period after
the date of manufacture." H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 4 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644.
268 Id. at 6.
366
STANDARD OF CARE PREEMPTION
aircraft," which resets each time a new part is installed, but only
with respect to that part.26 9 GARA is limited to smaller aircraft,
defining "general aviation aircraft" as any FAA-certified aircraft
with a seating capacity of fewer than twenty passengers and that
was not "engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations"
at the time of the accident.
270
GARA carves out four exceptions to the statute of repose.27 1
The most important is the first, which applies when a manufac-
turer either "knowingly misrepresented to . . . or concealed or
withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration, required in-
formation that is material and relevant to the performance or
the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or [component
part] that is causally related to the harm which the claimant al-
legedly suffered. ' 272 The other three exceptions apply when a
person injured or killed in an accident "is a passenger for pur-
poses of receiving treatment for a medical or other emer-
gency,"27 or "was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the
accident, ' 274 or when the suit is "brought under a written war-
ranty enforceable under law but for [GARA] ."275 GARA "super-
sedes any State law" to the extent that state law would otherwise
allow a claim to be brought after the eighteen-year statute of
repose has elapsed.276
1. Purpose and Intended Scope of GARA
Congress passed GARA to address what the House Report
deemed a "'perceived' liability crisis in the general aviation in-
"127721dustry, and to spur economic growth in that business.278 In-
dustry leaders testified before Congress describing the sharp
decline in industry sales,279 much of which they attributed to
large increases in liability insurance premiums brought about by
long-tail claimants suing for alleged manufacturing defects in
269 GARA, 108 Stat. 1552, § 2(a)(2).
270 Id. § 2(c).
271 Id. § (2)(b).
272 Id. § (2)(b)(1).
273 Id. § (2) (b) (2).
274 Id. § (2) (b) (3).
275 Id. § (2) (b) (4).
276 Id. § (2)(d).
277 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 5 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1638.
278 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 3.
279 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 4.
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decades-old airplanes. 28  The House Report found that al-
though U.S. sales of general aviation aircraft declined from
17,000 units in 1979 to just 954 in 1993, the industry's product
liability costs increased over the same time from $24 million to
more than $200 million annually.28 ' The House Report noted
that GARA's statute of repose was intended as "a narrow and
considered response" to the liability crisis, and that it was delib-
erately crafted to be limited in scope, unlike previous proposals
that sought to "revise substantially a number of substantive and
procedural matters relating to State tort law. ' 282 The report
reasoned:
Given the conjunction of all these exceptional considerations,
the Committee was willing to take the unusual step to preempt-
ing State law in this one extremely limited instance. The legisla-
tion attempts to strike a fair balance by providing some certainty
to manufacturers, which will spur the development of new jobs,
while preserving victims' right to bring suit for compensation in
certain particularly compelling circumstances. In essence, the
bill acknowledges that, for those general aviation aircraft and
component parts in service beyond the statute of repose, any de-
sign or manufacturing defect not prevented or identified by the
Federal regulatory process by then should, in most instances,
have manifested itself.283
The House Report provides that where a state statute of re-
pose is shorter than eighteen years, affording manufacturers
greater protection from long-tail claims, GARA preemption
does not apply.28 4
2. Judicial Interpretation of GARA
GARA's limited preemptive reach has proven relatively
straightforward and uncontroversial. Courts followed the lead
of the legislative history and confined GARA preemption to
those instances in which a conflicting state statute of repose is
longer than the eighteen years prescribed in GARA.285
280 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 1.
281 Id. at 1-2.
282 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 6.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 7.
285 See, e.g., Lucia v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1269 (S.D.
Ala. 2001); Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 300, 305 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531, 541 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
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Although a complete survey of GARA preemption issues is be-
yond the scope of this article, the three cases that follow give a
general sense of the preemption issues that arise under the stat-
ute. The first case, Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., is an early case in
which the court emphasized the legislative history of GARA, as
subsequent cases have likewise done, in concluding that the pre-
emptive reach of the Act is narrow and carefully defined.2"6 The
second, Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., serves as an exam-
ple of a court finding that GARA preempted state law, and ar-
guably interpreting GARA as having a preemptive reach
somewhat beyond the court's interpretation in Wright.287 The
third case, Lucia v. Teledyne Continental Motors, is included here
for its analysis of what GARA may have added to the argument
that the Federal Aviation Act does not completely preempt re-
lated state law.288
a. Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd.
Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd. arose from a 1995 crash of a 1967
model Cessna twin engine airplane, in which the pilot was
killed.289 The administrator of the pilot's estate filed a lawsuit in
Michigan state court against Cessna and two other defendants
based on state law claims of wrongful death and product liabil-
ity.29 ° The defendants removed to federal court and the plain-
tiff moved to remand. 291
The defendants did not argue that GARA completely pre-
empted the plaintiffs state law claims; instead, they contended
that whether the complaint met GARA's "knowing misrepresen-
tation exception" was a substantial federal question conferring
"arising under" federal jurisdiction.292 The court granted the
plaintiffs motion to remand, holding that GARA does not cre-
ate a federal cause of action and that the issue of whether the
plaintiff met the knowing misrepresentation exception did not
amount to a substantial federal question. 293 Although the court
was not squarely presented with the issue of whether and when
286 Wright, 930 F. Supp. at 305.
287 Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124 (Ct. App.
2000).
288 See generally Lucia, 173 F. Supp. at 1253.
289 Wright, 930 F. Supp. at 301.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 301-02.
292 Id. at 302-03, 305.
293 Id. at 305.
2011] 369
JOURNAL OF AIR LAWAND COMMERCE
GARA preempts state law, the court addressed preemption
nonetheless in emphasizing GARA's limited scope:
GARA is a statute of repose and merely serves a gatekeeping
function for Plaintiffs [state-law] cause of action. There is noth-
ing in GARA's legislative history to support an argument that
Congress intended GARA to create a body of federal common
law. Nor does the Act preempt a state's substantive law regarding
negligence or breach of warranty claims. Rather, GARA is nar-
rowly drafted to preempt only [state-law] statutes of limitation or
repose that would permit lawsuits beyond GARA's 18 year limita-
tion period in circumstances where its exceptions do not
apply.2
94
The court relied on House Report No. 103-525, part II in sup-
port of its conclusion that Congress intended GARA to preempt
only state statutes of repose or limitation of fewer than eighteen
years.295 The court acknowledged that GARA can amount to "'a
formidable first hurdle' to a plaintiff bringing a product liability
lawsuit against a general aviation aircraft manufacturer" but
noted that the hurdle may be overcome where the knowing mis-
representation exception applies.296 Thus, although the court
based its holding on both the lack of a federally created cause of
action under GARA and the lack of a substantial federal ques-
tion in the case, the court made clear that, had the defendants
argued for preemption, they would not have prevailed because
of the "knowing misrepresentation exception.2 9 7
b. Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp.
In Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., the preemption issue
was whether the plaintiffs could circumvent GARA's statute of
repose under California successor liability law.298 The case arose
after a 1995 crash of an airplane that seriously injured both the
pilot and his passenger. 299 The crash was allegedly caused by a
defective carburetor manufactured and sold in 1968.30 The
claimants sued the plane's owner, mechanic, engine manufac-
294 Id.
295 Id. at 303.
296 Id. at 305 (quoting Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 929 F. Supp.
380, 383 (D. Wyo. 1996)).
297 See id.
298 Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 132 (Ct. App.
2000).
299 Id. at 127.
300 Id.
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turer, airplane manufacturer, and the successor to the airplane
manufacturer (Precision) under theories of negligence, strict li-
ability, and breach of warranty." 1 The plaintiffs settled with the
owner and mechanic.0 2 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the three remaining defendants, holding that
GARA's statute of repose barred the claims. 3  The plaintiffs ap-
pealed the court's summary judgment ruling.304
Some context may be helpful. The plaintiffs argued that be-
cause Precision, as a successor company, did not manufacture
the carburetor, it was not a "manufacturer" under GARA and
was therefore not entitled to the protection of the eighteen-year
statute of repose. 05 The court acknowledged that "[t]he term
'manufacturer' is nowhere defined in GARA, and GARA does
not specifically include successor manufacturers within the pro-
tection of the statute."306 After noting that the purpose of
GARA was to revitalize the general aviation industry-to which
Precision belonged-by protecting aircraft manufacturers
against long-tail claims, the appellate court held the statute ap-
plies to successor manufacturers.0 7 Otherwise, the court rea-
soned, "[t]he central objective of GARA would be materially
undermined."'3 0
The plaintiffs conceded in their appeal that GARA immunizes
successors from claims after the statute of repose has run but
only "to the extent [the successor] has assumed such liability
from the manufacturer. "'309 The plaintiffs argued that under
California state law, a successor assumes its predecessor's liabil-
ity for torts "only in limited circumstances, which do not apply
here. 3 10 Because the successor did not assume liability from the
manufacturer under California law, GARA did not apply. 1' The
court rejected this, reasoning:
301 Id. at 129.
302 Id. at n.1.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 130.






311 See id. (The court did not discuss what theories would entitle the plaintiffs
to relief if California successor liability law were to apply to prevent Precision
from assuming tort liability from its predecessor.).
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Because of the preemptive reach of GARA... California law re-
lating to successor liability does not govern if it would allow a
claim otherwise barred by GARA. In other words, GARA cannot
be interpreted by reference to state law. Rather the question is
whether Precision assumed the obligations and duties of the
manufacturer, as well as liability for a breach of those duties,
under the relevant federal law.312
The court's interpretation of GARA's "preemptive reach" is
not entirely clear, however."' Its broad statement that "GARA
cannot be interpreted by reference to state law" could be inter-
preted as opening the door to a potential expansion of GARA
preemption. 14 Yet, it is not clear that the court intended this
result, as the opinion failed to address the necessary implica-
tions; for example, the opinion is silent on whether GARA may
be "interpreted by reference to state law" where state law would
afford manufacturers stronger protection from long-tail claims
than federal law.3 15 Perhaps the sweeping language of Burroughs
can be attributed to imprecise writing that should not be con-
strued beyond the court's holding-that California successor lia-
bility law is preempted if it would "allow a claim otherwise
barred by GARA."3 16 This creates no obvious conflict with other
courts' narrow interpretation of GARA preemption.3 17 On the
other hand, perhaps the court intended for its language to be
read literally, interpreting GARA to mean that only federal suc-
cessor liability law applies with reference to it, thus arguably ex-
panding the preemptive reach of GARA, at least in that limited
context.
318
c. Lucia v. Teledyne Continental Motors
In Lucia v. Teledyne Continental Motors, the court examined the
relationship between GARA section 2(d) and the FAA, particu-
larly its "saving clause,"1 9 to determine whether the FAA com-
312 Id. at 132-33 (internal citation omitted) (The court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument without reaching the issue of whether California successor liability law
conflicts with GARA.).





318 See id. at 132-33.
319 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2000).
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pletely preempts state law in the field of aviation safety. 2 °
Although the facts of the case did not implicate GARA-the dis-
pute involved recently manufactured engine crankshafts and no
accident-the court found that GARA "is relevant here for pur-
poses of preemption to address the statute's effect on state
law."'3 21 Citing GARA's legislative history, the court recognized a
twofold purpose: (1) "to provide the opportunity to restart large
scale production of light piston general aviation aircraft in order
to create jobs and exports ' 322 and (2) to "avoid[ ] fundamental
reform of the tort system. "323
Reading GARA in conjunction with the FAA rather than in
the isolated context of long-tail claims, the court concluded that
GARA "affirmatively preserves a role for state law, which contin-
ues to govern the adjudication of aviation products liability cases
involving claims for defective design or manufacture.3 24 Un-
derlying this conclusion, the court adopted language from an
article favoring the view that the FAA does not completely pre-
empt related state tort law:
Congress gave the various courts a definitive expression of fed-
eral legislative intent. It did so by failing to address federal pre-
emption of state tort actions for aircraft accidents and by
specifically preserving any and all state law not superseded.
GARA § 2(d), in company with preservation of the 49 U.S.C.
§ 40120(c) general "savings clause," may thus be read as clarify-
ing the scope and strengthening the role of state tort law applica-
bility to aviation products liability actions.325
The court thus used GARA to support its conclusion that the
FAA does not "completely preempt state law in the field of avia-
tion hardware safety. 3 2 6
320 Lucia v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1269-70 (S.D. Ala.
2001).
321 Id. at 1269.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 1270.
325 Id. at 1269 (quoting Timothy S. McAllister, A "Tail" of Liability Reform: Gen-
eral Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 ("GARA ") & the General Aviation Industry in
the United States, 23 TRANsP. L.J. 301, 313 (1995-1996)).
3263 Id. at 1270.
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IV. RECENT AVIATION SAFETY CASES
Standard of care preemption has been at the center of avia-
tion law in recent yearsY 7 Three relatively recent cases illus-
trate several of the key, unresolved issues involved in the courts'
analyses. Each of these cases involves claims against airlines,
327 Although far from exhaustive, the following are examples of federal courts
that have tackled the issue of federal preemption in aviation litigation. City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (holding, 5-4,
that a city ordinance prohibiting aircraft from taking off during certain night
hours was invalid because Congress had indicated its intent to preempt state con-
trol over aircraft noise); Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands
& Watercourses Comm'n, 634 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2011) (joining other circuits
in concluding "that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of air safety and
thereby preempt state regulation of that field," and holding that the plaintiffs
claims relating to land use permit requirements were outside the field of pre-
empted law); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 475-76 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that federal law preempted state-law duties to warn about risks associ-
ated with flying and deep vein thrombosis but remanding to determine a factual
issue rather than deciding whether claims relating to airline seat configuration
were preempted by the ADA in view of its economic impact); Greene v. B.F.
Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 797 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
federal law preempted a state-law failure to warn claim arising from a helicopter
crash); Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a passenger's claims against an airline for inadequate leg room and a lack of
warnings relating to deep vein thrombosis, a blood clot condition he allegedly
contracted on a flight, were preempted by federal law); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing an in-depth analysis of aviation
preemption and holding that state law regarding the standard of care for plain-
tiffs' negligence claims was preempted); Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 195 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a defamation claim that a
travel agency brought against an airline was not preempted by federal law);
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1444 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the plaintiffs' design-defect claims were not preempted by the FAA because
of the presence of a saving clause and an express preemption clause that does
not mention airline safety), abrogated by Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 868 (2000) (holding that the presence of a saving clause does not allow for a
broad reading of the FAA's express preemption provision but also does not fore-
close the possibility that state-law claims are nonetheless impliedly preempted);
French v. Pam Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a state
law requiring drug testing for pilots of interstate airline carriers was preempted);
Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 429, 438-39 (M.D. Pa.
2010) (holding that state-law standards of care regarding claims arising from an
airline accident were preempted by federal law); Landis v. US Airways, Inc., No.
07-1216, 2008 WL 728369, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2008) (holding that standards
of care imposed by state common law are preempted by the FAA); Deahl v. Air
Wis. Airlines Corp., No. 03-C-5150, 2003 WL 22843073, at *4 (S.D. Ill., Nov. 26,
2003) (adopting the reasoning of Abdullah in holding that "state standards of
care are preempted but state remedies are not"); Curtin v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 183
F. Supp. 2d 664, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that state-law standards of care are
preempted by federal law regarding emergency evacuations from an airplane).
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leaving plausible questions about whether they are precedent in
general aviation cases. 328 Those questions are beyond the scope
of this paper and will be left unanswered here.
Three circuits in particular recently wrestled with standard of
care preemption in aviation litigation; two circuits narrowed ear-
lier implied preemption rulings,3 29 while the third moved in the
other direction.3 ° Is this a circuit split worthy of the Supreme
Court's consideration or merely different outcomes based on
different facts? Do these cases suggest a trend in preemption
law and, if so, a trend in which direction? Rather than try to
definitively answer these questions here, we instead offer an
analysis of the cases that we hope will identify issues for lawyers
and judges to consider. Part IV will discuss each circuit in turn,
first reviewing the law as it previously existed and then discuss-
ing recent developments.
A. THIRD CIRCUIT: ABDULLAH TO ELAssAAn
Perhaps the most prominent-or at least most often cited-
aviation preemption case is Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.33
Khaled Abdullah, along with several other individuals, sued
American Airlines for injuries sustained while aboard Flight
1473 traveling from New York to San Juan, Puerto Rico.332 Al-
though the first officer noticed a developing weather system
along the flight's anticipated course, turned on the passenger
fasten seatbelt lights, and notified the flight attendants, none of
the passengers were ever warned about the possibility of turbu-
lence.333 A short time later, the flight encountered extreme tur-
bulence, and Mr. Abdullah and several other passengers were
injured. 4
328 See, e.g., John D. McClune, There Is No Complete, Implied, or Field Federal Pre-
emption of State Law Personal Injury/Wrongful Death Negligence or Product Liability
Claims in General Aviation Cases, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 717, 719 (2006). How cases
decided subsequent to this article impact its premise remains to be seen.
329 Compare Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 124 (3d Cir.
2010), and Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d
806, 808 (9th Cir. 2009), with Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 376, and Montalvo, 508 F.3d at
475-76.
330 Compare US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir.
2010), with Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444.
331 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 363; see Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 02-4185-
KES, 2006 WL 1084103, at *19 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006); see infra text accompanying
note 582.
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The plaintiffs filed suit against American Airlines contending
that the pilot, first officer, and flight attendants had not taken
appropriate evasive maneuvers to avoid the convective weather,
failed to warn passengers about the possibility of turbulence,
and that because of these failures the plaintiffs were injured. 35
At trial, the district court applied territorial common law -to de-
termine the applicable standard of care for plaintiffs' negli-
gence claims; the jury found the airline liable and awarded
plaintiffs more than two million dollars.3"6 American filed post-
trial motions asserting that because federal law preempted terri-
torial common law, the district court had set forth an improper
basis for standard of care. 3 7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the
FAA preempted the standard of care. 3 8 The district court
agreed, stating that "the FAA impliedly preempts state and terri-
torial regulation of aviation safety and standards of care. ' 339 Be-
cause it previously utilized the improper standard of care, the
district court ordered a new trial and the plaintiffs filed an inter-
locutory appeal. 4 °
The court in Abdullah provided an in-depth analysis of the
FAA and the history surrounding its enactment, citing reports
and testimony from both the United States Senate and House of
Representatives. 341 The court concluded that Congress intends
for the Federal Aviation Administration to "exercise sole discre-
tion in regulating air safety. 31 4 2 "To effectuate this broad au-
thority to regulate air safety, the Administrator of the [Aviation
Administration] has implemented a comprehensive system of
rules and regulations, which promotes flight safety by regulating
pilot certification, pilot pre-flight duties, pilot flight responsibili-
ties, and flight rules. 343
Having determined that state and territorial standards of care
were impliedly preempted, the court in Abdullah reasoned that
the appropriate federal standard of care was found in 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13(a), which relates to operation of an aircraft. 344 Applying
335 Id.
336 Id. at 365-66.
337 Id. at 366.
338 Id. at 376.
339 Id. at 366.
340 Id.
341 Id. at 368-69.
342 Id. at 369.
-43 Id. (multiple footnotes omitted).
U4 Id. at 371.
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this section, the appropriate standard was avoiding "careless or
reckless" operation.345
Thus, in determining the standards of care in an aviation negli-
gence action, a court must refer not only to specific regulations
but also to the overall concept that aircraft may not be operated
in a careless or reckless manner. The applicable standard of care
is not limited to a particular regulation of a specific area; it ex-
pands to encompass the issue of whether the overall operation or
conduct in question was careless or reckless.346
The court recognized that other courts of appeals had relied
on an express preemption clause in the ADA as evidence of
Congress's intent not to preempt federal standards of care under
the FAA.347 The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the
other circuits' rationale.348 Instead, it held that "Congress, in
enacting the FAA and relevant regulations, intended generally
to preempt state and territorial regulation of aviation safety.
Nevertheless, we find that plaintiffs may recover damages under
state and territorial remedial schemes. 349
B. ELAssAAD V. INDEPENDENCE AIR, INC.
In Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., the Third Circuit appears
to have pulled back from its decision in Abdullahf5 ° Although
the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that the FAA preempts the
standard of care in state law negligence claims, it distinguished
Abdullah because Mr. Elassaad was not hurt while the airliner
was being operated for purposes of air navigation. 351 Thus, Elas-
saad avoided a wholesale endorsement of standard of care pre-
emption and limited its application to in-flight safety only.3 52 A
detailed analysis is needed to understand how the court of ap-
peals reached this decision.
Joseph Elassaad's right leg was amputated in 1978; he uses
crutches to walk? In February 2004, Mr. Elassaad was a passen-
ger on a Delta flight from Boston to Philadelphia operated by
345 Id. (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a)).
346 Id.
347 d. at 372.
348 Id. at 372-75.
349 Id. at 367-68; see discussion infra Part III.A.
350 See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2010).
351 Id.
352 See id.
353 Id. at 122.
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Independence Air.354 After boarding the airplane (a Fairchild
Dornier 328), Mr. Elassaad tried to stow his crutches but found
that the overhead bins were not long enough to accommodate
them. 55 The only flight attendant onboard helped Mr. Elassaad
store his crutches with the checked luggage. 56
The flight was uneventful3 57 After the plane landed, the
flight attendant asked Mr. Elassaad to remain seated while the
other passengers deplaned.3 5 He complied with the request,
and when the flight attendant returned his crutches, he "used
them to approach the aircraft door. ' 359 The air stairs "had a
railing on the left side, but not on the right."360 As Mr. Elassaad
tried to get down the stairs on his crutches, "he lost his balance
and fell off the right side of the staircase, striking his shoulder
on the pavement" and sustaining personal injuries for which sur-
gery was required. 6'
Mr. Elassaad sued Independence Air and Delta in Penn-
sylvania state court, claiming the airlines were negligent under
Pennsylvania law because they (1) were "operating an [airplane]
made defective by" the faulty design of its passenger stairs and
hand rail; (2) "fail[ed] to inspect and [properly] maintain the"
passenger stairs and hand rail; and (3) "fail [ed] to offer and
[provide] ... assistance to [him] as he" left the airplane. 62 In-
dependence Air removed the case to federal court based on di-
versity jurisdiction. 63 Mr. Elassaad voluntarily dismissed his
claims against Delta after Independence admitted it was respon-
sible for all aspects of the flight.3 64
Independence Air then moved for partial summary judgment
on Mr. Elassaad's first claim,365 arguing that under the Third
Circuit's decision in Abdullah,366 the FAA impliedly preempted










363 Id. at 122-23.
364 Id. at 123.
365 Id.
366 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
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plane. 67 In his response, Mr. Elassaad conceded that the court
was obliged to follow Abdullah and that, because the FAA had
issued regulations governing integral stair systems,368 his claims
based on the alleged defect in the stairs and hand rail were im-
pliedly preempted. 69 With the product defect based claims dis-
missed, Mr. Elassaad's only remaining claim was that
Independence Air had been negligent in failing to assist him in
disembarking from the airplane, including failing to "mak[e]
available all appropriate safety measures and devices.
''3 70
With Mr. Elassaad's claims narrowed in this way, Indepen-
dence Air moved for summary judgment a second time, arguing
that the ACAA371 and regulations implementing it 3 72 preempted
state-law standards on how air carriers are to provide service to
disabled passengers. 73 Although the ACAA requires carriers to
provide assistance when requested to do so by a disabled passen-
ger, 74 Mr. Elassaad conceded that the airline was not required
to offer him assistance and that because of his natural tendency
toward self-reliance, he purposely did not ask for assistance. 75
Mr. Elassaad responded to the airline's summary judgment
motion with four arguments: (1) "the ACAA and its [accompa-
nying] regulations were intended only to prevent discrimination
against disabled passengers, not to establish [safe-operating]
standards;" (2) notwithstanding the ACAA, "air carriers could be
[found] liable for failing to ... offer assistance to disabled pas-
sengers, . . . if that failure compromised passenger safety;" (3)
absent FAA regulations defining what assistance carriers must
offer deplaning passengers, "state negligence law governs [the]
carrier's duty of care," and the airline's failure "to offer him
[help amounted to] negligence under Pennsylvania common
law;" and (4) the standard of care in 14 C.F.R. § 91.13, "which
367 Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 123.
368 See 14 C.F.R. § 25.783(i) (2004).
369 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Response to Independence Air's Motion
for Partial Summary Adjudication at 3, Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613
F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3878).
370 Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 123-24.
371 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2000).
372 14 C.F.R. §§ 382.1-.70 (2004).
373 Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 123.
374 Id. The ACAA regulations pertinent to the Elassaad decision were subse-
quently reorganized and currently appear in 14 C.F.R. § 382.95(a) (2009). That
provision imposes requirements identical to those of the earlier regulation, 14
C.F.R. § 382.39(a) (2004).
375 See id.
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prohibits carriers from operating an aircraft in a 'careless or
reckless manner,' imposed a duty of care on [the airline] to of-
fer him deplaning assistance. 376
The district court rejected each of these arguments, holding
that under Abdullah "federal law [established] the standard of
care for [Mr.] Elassaad's negligence" claims.377 The court
"adopted [the airline's] view" that "the applicable standard of
care" was "found in the ACAA regulations. '37 Based on these
findings, the court concluded that the ACAA "impose [d] no af-
firmative duty to offer assistance to a disabled ... passenger, 379
and even if 14 C.F.R. § 91.13380 were applied in this context, Mr.
"Elassaad had failed to 'point[ ] to caselaw or expert testimony
to establish that the [airline's failure] to offer assistance to [Elas-
saad] constituted careless or reckless conduct.'" 3 1 The court
granted the airline's summary judgment motion, and Mr. Elas-
saad appealed. 2
The court of appeals reversed the district court, finding that
Abdullah did not control the pending facts and that neither the
FAA nor the ACAA preempted the standard of care applicable
to the airline's conduct. 38 3 The court's decision rest on four
conclusions, the most important of which is the court's limita-
tion of Abdullah.
First, the court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Abdullah that
the FAA preempts only the standard of care, not the remaining
elements of a state law negligence claim. 4 Second, the court
376 Id.
377 Id. at 123-24.
378 Id. at 124.
379 Id.
380 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2009) provides:
(a) Aircraft operations for the purpose of air navigation. No per-
son may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another. (b) Aircraft operations
other than for the purpose of air navigation. No person may oper-
ate an aircraft, other than for the purpose of air navigation, on any
part of the surface of an airport used by aircraft for air commerce
(including areas used by those aircraft for receiving or discharging
persons or cargo), in a careless or reckless manner so as to endan-
ger the life or property of another.
38, Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 124.
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 Id. at 125.
380
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curtailed Abdullah's holding; federal law preemption of the en-
tire field of aviation safety was limited only to in-flight safety. 85
Our discussion of the regulatory framework giving rise to pre-
emption in Abdullah focused exclusively on safety while a plane is
in the air, flying between its origin and destination. Our use of
the term "aviation safety" in Abdullah to describe the field pre-
empted by federal law was thus limited to in-air safety.
3 8 6
Although the passenger's injury in Abdullah occurred in flight,
the court of appeals nonetheless held broadly that " [t] he appli-
cable standard of care is not limited to a particular regulation of
a specific area; it expands to encompass the issue of whether the
overall operation or conduct in question was careless or
reckless." 3 7
In Elassaad, the court backed away from this broad asser-
tion.188 "[0] ur analysis of field preemption in Abdullah-specifi-
cally, the 'field' of 'aviation safety'-was in the context of in-
flight safety. This is clear from a careful reading of our deci-
sion."38 9 Thus, despite Abdullah's holding that there was implied
preemption "'of the entire field of aviation safety' as a result of
the Aviation Act and its implementing regulations,"390 the Elas-
saad court was convinced it had to start its preemption analysis
from a clean slate.
Having determined that Abdullah applied to in-flight activities
only, Elassaad held that Abdullah was not controlling and that
claims surrounding deplaning presented questions of first im-
pression. 91 Thus, the court took up the task of determining
whether the FAA, the ACAA, and any accompanying regulations
preempted the state standard of care, thus giving rise to the
court's third basis for its decision. 92
The court agreed that field preemption was the only viable
argument concerning the FAA and its implementing regula-
tions.393 Reviewing the legislative history and text of the FAA,
385 Id. at 126-27.
386 Id. at 127.
387 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
388 See Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 125-26.
389 Id. at 126 (referencing its analysis in Abdullah of "pilot certification, pilot
pre-flight duties, pilot flight responsibilities.... flight rules, . . . airspace manage-
ment, flight operations, and aviation noise").
390 Id. (quoting Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 365).
391 Id. at 124, 127.
392 Id. at 127.
393 Id. at 127-28.
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the court was satisfied that "[n] othing in the statute pertains to
safety during disembarkation; rather, the statute's safety provi-
sions appear to be principally concerned with safety in connec-
tion with operations associated with flight." '94 Given that Mr.
Elassaad's accident occurred while the airplane was parked at
the gate, in-flight safety provisions that preempted the standard
of care in Abdullah were not applicable. 95 Other broad stan-
dards for general safe operation of an aircraft were similarly
inapplicable.396
Specifically, the court noted that two regulations, 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13(a) and (b), implemented pursuant to the FAA, provided
"general description [s] of the standard" of care "for the safe op-
eration of [an] aircraft. 3 ' The first, § 91.13(a), applies to oper-
ations "for the purpose of air navigation. ' 398 The court looked
to the plain meaning of "operate" and "air navigation" to decide
whether those terms showed Congress's intent to occupy the
field.3 9 The court was not convinced; "air navigation," although
not defined, reasonably applied only to operations in flight or to
tasks related to flight.4 0 "[W]e conclude that a flight crew's
oversight of the disembarkation of passengers-after a plane has
finished taxiing to the gate, and its crew has opened the air-
craft's door and lowered its stairs-does not constitute 'opera-
tions for the purpose of air navigation.' "4"
The court's discussion of § 91.13(b), dealing with operations
"other than for the purpose of air navigation," should be consid-
ered dicta because both Mr. Elassaad and Independence Air
conceded that it was not applicable.40 2 Thus, because the court
deemed Abdullah only applicable to in-flight incidents, and be-
cause the FAA and its accompanying regulations did not touch
on plane disembarkation, the court held that "the Aviation Act
394 Id. at 128.
395 Id. at 128-30.
396 Id. at 129.
397 Id. (internal citation omitted).
398 Id. (internal citation omitted).
399 Id. at 129-30.
400 Id. (looking to other definitions, such as "air navigation" and "air naviga-
tion facility," 49 U.S.C. § 40102 (a) (4), (33), as support for its position).
401 Id. at 130 (footnote omitted).
402 Id. (The court stated that "[t]here [was] no evidence that, by watching Elas-
saad exit the plane, the flight crew was engaging in any acts that 'impart[ed]
some physical movement to the aircraft, or involve[d] the manipulation of the
controls of the aircraft[]'" as the court felt necessaryfor § 91.13(b) to preempt a
state standard of care.).
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and its safety regulations do not preempt [state law] standards
of care in this negligence action. '"403
The fourth and final basis for the court's decision was that
Elassaad's negligence claim was not preempted by the ACAA
under either field or conflict preemption theories. 40 4  The
ACAA was designed only to proscribe airline discrimination
based on disabilities.4 °5 Regarding field preemption, the court
was not convinced that it was Congress's intent to preempt a
state regulation that governed interactions between a disabled
passenger and the air carrier.40 6 "At most, the ACAA might pre-
empt state nondiscrimination laws as they apply to discrimina-
tion by air carriers against disabled passengers. "407
In addition to rejecting Independence's proposition that the
field of air carrier interaction with disabled passengers was pre-
empted by the ACAA, the court also found no conflict preemp-
tion.408 Independence argued the ACAA's purpose was to
"protect the dignity of disabled passengers, ' 409 relying on several
federal regulations that (1) stipulate an air carrier should not
offer guidance unless it is apparent the passenger needs help;
(2) prohibit an air carrier from insisting that a passenger accept
assistance; and (3) require an air carrier to provide assistance,
upon request, when "enplaning and deplaning. '410 The court
rejected Independence's arguments, holding that any state-law
requirements could "easily coexist with the ACAA's mandate
that Independence not discriminate against [Elassaad]."411
So, what is the practitioner to conclude? The Third Circuit's
limiting interpretation of Abdullah signals its unease with its ear-
lier broad reading of implied preemption of state law standards
of care.412 But in doing so, the court in Elassaad likely created
more ambiguity.




-7 Id. at 132 (internal citation omitted).
408 Id. at 132-33.
409 Id. at 133 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
410 Id. (citing Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 70
Fed. Reg. 41,482, 41,504 (July 19, 2005); 14 C.F.R. § 382.7(a)(2) (2004); 14
C.F.R. § 382.39(a) (2004)).
411 Id.
412 For an additional foray into Abdullah and Elassaad, see Sikkelee v. Precision
Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 429 (M.D. Pa. 2010). On the heels of the Third
Circuit's decision in Elassaad, the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
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For instance, the court of appeals held that plane disembarka-
tion is not aircraft operation.413 But, the court did not provide
where "aircraft operation" for preemption analysis purposes be-
gins and ends.414 Clearly, the court recognized it left more ques-
tions unanswered than answered. "We do not reach the issue of
whether other activities that occur while a plane is on the
ground, such as taxiing or the process of opening an aircraft's
doors, would constitute 'operations' such that they would be
subject to federal preemption. '415 The court did not consider
whether baggage handlers were unloading luggage from the air-
plane. Had a refueling truck started to refuel? Was the caterer
loading ice, snacks, and beverages? And what if the plane had
just arrived from taxiing and was in the process of connecting to
the skywalk? Would these activities have been enough to fall
within the category of "operations"? There are no clear answers
to these questions in Elassaad.
trict of Pennsylvania in Sikkelee was presented with the issue of federal general
aviation preemption. The defendants argued that the FAA, and other applicable
aviation standards and legislation, preempt the entire field of aviation safety. Id.
at 432. The plaintiff in Sikkelee, in turn, argued that its claims were not pre-
empted, asserting that Abdullah was limited to commercial operations, that Abdul-
lah was flawed because it failed to consider GARA, and finally that Abdullah was
no longer good law in light of Wyeth v. Levine. Id. at 432-33. The district court in
Sikkelee was torn between the arguments, but felt compelled to follow Abdullah
and Elassaad and apply federal preemption in the general aviation context. Id. at
438-39. The court noted the difficult nature of its decision, writing:
Candidly, we note that the decision that follows has not been easy
to reach. Both parties advance compelling arguments in support of
or in opposition to the Motion, and each interpretation finds sup-
port in this clearly underdeveloped body of law. Like the learned
counsel for the parties, the Court has conducted exhaustive re-
search and has considered all apparent interpretations and conclu-
sions. We thus detail the controlling and instructive law that has
formed our conclusion below.
There is certainly not an absence of authority that agrees with
Plaintiffs proffered interpretation of the law. Indeed, we find the
logic therein alluring, and perceive the wisdom of the various deci-
sions in other Circuits that have failed to find preemption in cir-
cumstances similar to the case at bar. Nonetheless, no matter how
compelling their reasoning, those authorities are not controlling
for our purposes as we must follow the state of the law as articulated
by the Third Circuit. The legal principle of stare decisis commands
no less.
Sikkelee, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
413 See supra text accompanying note 400.
414 See Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 129-31.
415 Id. at 130 n.14.
STANDARD OF CARE PREEMPTION
C. NINTH CIRCUIT: MONTALVO TO MARTIN
In Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit has also narrowed its view of standard of care pre-
emption.416 Before discussing Martin, however, it may be help-
ful to understand the Ninth Circuit's earlier aviation
preemption cases.
Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines involved fourteen consolidated cases
originally filed in California state court where passengers sued
airlines for causing them to suffer deep vein thrombosis in
flight.417 The passengers claimed that the airlines failed to warn
them of the danger of deep vein thrombosis and provided seat-
ing arrangements that were unsafe.418 Deep vein thrombosis "is
a medical condition that occurs when a blood clot forms in a
deep vein"-most commonly in an individual's leg.419 A clot can
dislodge and travel through the individual's pulmonary system,
often reaching either the brain or lungs.420 Deep vein thrombo-
sis is a dangerous condition; indeed, several of the plaintiffs in
Montalvo died as a result of it.421
The airlines removed the suits to federal court, where they
were consolidated and then transferred to the Northern District
of California.42 2 The airlines sought, and the district court
granted, summary judgment on the defective seat design
claim.4 23 The airlines also sought dismissal of the consolidated
suit, arguing that the ADA expressly preempted the separate un-
safe seating configuration claim and that the FAA impliedly pre-
empted plaintiffs' failure to warn claims. 4  The district court
agreed; plaintiffs appealed the failure to warn claim and the un-
safe seat configuration claim.425
The first issue on appeal was whether the FAA, subsequent
amendments, and applicable federal regulations preempted
state law duties to warn about the risks associated with flying and
deep vein thrombosis.4 26 The second issue was whether claims
416 See Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806,
811 (9th Cir. 2009).
417 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 2007).







425 Id. at 470.
426 Id. at 468.
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relating to airline seat configuration were preempted by the
ADA in view of its economic impact.4 27 The district court deter-
mined that preemption existed as to the first issue.428 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that the FAA
impliedly preempted the failure to warn claim, but it reversed
and remanded the issue of ADA preemption on seat configura-
tion, noting that this was a closer question.429
In affirming the district court's finding that the FAA impliedly
preempts the entire field of aviation safety, the Ninth Circuit
expressly adopted the rationale in Abdullah, stating, "We adopt
the Third Circuit's broad, historical approach to hold that fed-
eral law generally establishes the applicable standards of care in
the field of aviation safety. ' 43 0 Specifically, Montalvo determined
that Congress intended to occupy the field of aviation safety as
evidenced by the FAA's purpose, language, and history sur-
rounding its enactment, as well as accompanying federal regula-
tions.43' It was clear to the Montalvo court that Congress had
impliedly preempted state law regulations of passenger warn-
ings; had it not, each state would be able to enact differing stan-
dards, potentially exposing the airlines to fifty different
potential standards of care.432
The seat configuration issue, however, was not as clear cut.
433
The plaintiffs claimed that the current seat configuration caused
blood clots; the only remedy, argued the airlines, was to reduce
the number of seats (increasing legroom), which would in turn
raise individual ticket prices.4 34 Such a requirement, according
to the court, would be a "forbidden indirect regulation of the
aviation industry under the ADA." '435 Because the Ninth Circuit
had previously narrowly construed the ADA's express preemp-
tion provision, the court in Montalvo was unable to determine
whether the seating configuration issue presented a "significant
427 Id. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment pertaining to seat design; the plaintiffs did not appeal this issue. Id. at
469-70.
428 Id. at 468.
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 Id. at 471-72.
432 Id. at 473.
433 Id. at 475 ("Without more factual development, we cannot determine
whether the preemptive reach ...extends as far as the seating configuration
issue presented in this case.").
434 Id. at 474.
435 Id.
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effect" on pricing.43 6 Thus, the court in Montalvo felt compelled
to reverse and remand for further fact determination.
Although the Ninth Circuit adopted Abdullah's broad inter-
pretation of standard of care preemption in aviation litigation, it
would soon have the opportunity to narrow its reach in
Martin.4 3 8
D. MARTIN EX REL. HECKMAN V. MIDWEST ExPRESs
HOLDINGS, INC.
In 2002, Carrie Heckman, accompanied by her infant son
Malcolm, flew on Skyway Airlines (a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Midwest Airlines) from Milwaukee to the Twin Cities.43 9 While
deplaning from the Fairchild Dornier 328 (the same type of
plane as in Elassaad), Ms. Heckman, who had Malcolm in her
arms, fell from the single-handrail airstair.44 ° She and Malcolm
struck the concrete ramp and were injured.44' Ms. Heckman
was also twenty-two weeks pregnant with her daughter Lola.442
About four weeks later, Lola was born prematurely and suffered
disabilities attributable to her mother's fall.443
On behalf of her children and herself, Ms. Heckman sued
Midwest Express for negligence and Fairchild Dornier for strict
product liability.444 She claimed the airline was negligent be-
cause it had failed to assist her as she and her son deplaned and
that the manufacturer was liable because the airstair design was
defective.445 After protracted procedural litigation, Midwest Ex-
436 Id. at 475.
437 Id. The court also noted that the Fifth Circuit in Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
had recently been presented with a similar factual scenario. Witty v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2004). There, plaintiffs acknowledged
that seat reconfiguration would ultimately result in increased airfare. Id. Thus,
the court in Witty dismissed the plaintiffs' claim as preempted under the ADA.
Id.
438 See Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806,
808 (9th Cir. 2009).
439 Brief of Appellants at 14, Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Hold-
ings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-55063).
440 Id.
441 Id. at 15.
442 Id. at 14.
443 See id. at 15.
444 Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 808
(9th Cir. 2009); Brief of Appellants, supra note 439, at 12.
445 Order Granting SummaryJudgment at 2, Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest
Express Holdings, Inc., No. 2:03-cv-04796-DMG-PJW (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006),
ECF No. 150.
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press agreed to pay Ms. Heckman $8 million in settlement and
then sought to recover that sum in an indemnity action against
Fairchild Dornier based on the alleged design defect.446
Fairchild Dornier resisted these claims and moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that (1) "federal law preempt[ed]
[Midwest Express's] [state law] claims because" federal legisla-
tion preempts "the entire field of aviation safety" and (2) an ex-
press warranty disclaimer contained in the sales contract for the
airplane barred Midwest Express from recovering settlement
costs from Fairchild Dornier.447 The district court granted
Fairchild Dornier's motion on the latter basis, finding the war-
ranty disclaimer absolved the manufacturer from any liability to
the airline.44
The district court rejected Fairchild Dornier's preemption ar-
gument, however, holding that Congress had not intended the
FAA to preempt the entire field of aviation safety.449 To support
its holding, the court relied on three federal statutes. First, it
found the FAA's saving clause was evidence that Congress did
not intend to preempt the entire field of aviation safety.450 Sec-
ond, that Congress, by enacting the eighteen-year statute of re-
pose in GARA,451 must have intended only to protect airplane
manufacturers from old liability claims, further suggesting that
Congress did not mean to preempt all-and particularly
newer-aviation-related, state law tort claims.452 Finally, the dis-
446 Martin, 555 F.3d at 808.
447 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 445.
448 Id. at 3 (The facts surrounding the warranty provision and the district
court's rationale for granting summary judgment based on it are not relevant
here. Thus, we have focused on only the district court's discussion of federal
preemption.).
449 Id. at 3, 7. To the extent the court's preemption analysis was not necessary
to its decision to grant Fairchild Dornier's motion for summary judgment, it is
arguably dicta.
450 Id. at 7-8.
451 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). In GARA, Congress
established an eighteen-year statute of repose for civil actions against manufactur-
ers of general aviation aircraft and component parts. Id. §§ 2(a)(1), 3(3). For
further reading on this topic, please see infta text accompanying note 452 and
GARA articles cited there.
452 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 445, at 8 (citing Monroe v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 832 (E.D. Tex. 2006)). The House
Judiciary Committee noted, "[GARA attempts to strike a fair balance by provid-
ing some certainty to manufacturers, which will spur the development of new
jobs, while preserving victims' right to bring suit for compensation in certain par-
ticularly compelling circumstances." H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 5 (1994),
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trict court considered whether an airline's providing its passen-
gers with a means of egress from an airplane amounted to
"services" under the ADA and found that it did not.45 3 Noting
that the Ninth Circuit construed "service" narrowly and limited
the word to the context of airline economic performance, the
district court decided that an ordinary personal injury lawsuit
was not a "service" such that federal law preempted Midwest Ex-
press's claim.454
Rounding out its preemption analysis, the district court found
that federal regulations did not preempt state laws applicable to
an airstair design.455 Although Fairchild Dornier claimed sev-
eral regulations preempted airstair design, the district court
thought only two regulations gave rise to colorable argu-
ments.45 '6 Fairchild Dornier's best argument concerned 14
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1647. See generally Lisa Normand, A Plaintiffs
Guide to Surviving the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) Defense: What Works
and What Doesn't, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 43, 71 (2007); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lor-
ber, The General Aviation Revitalization Act: How Rational CivilJustice Reform Revital-
ized an Industry, 67J. AIR L. & CoM. 1269, 1285-86 (2002) ("[GARA] preempts
state law to the extent state law provides for a longer period of repose, but does
not displace a state statute of repose that provides for a shorter period."); Robert
F. Hedrick, A Close and Critical Analysis of the New General Aviation Revitalization Act,
62J. AIR L. & CoM. 385, 415 (1996). Because a Fairchild Dornier 328 is a trans-
port category airplane and not a "general aviation" airplane to which GARA
would apply, the Martin court's reliance on GARA appears inapt.
459 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 445, at 10. The relevant
portion of the ADA, revised in 1994, provides: "a State . .. may not enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law
related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier .... .. " 49 U.S.C.
§§ 41713(b) (1), (4)(A) (1997); seeAm. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223
n.1 (1995) ("Congress intended [this] revision to make no substantive change" to
the pre-1994 version of the ADA.); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
454 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 445, at 10.
Congress used the word "service" in the phrase "rates, routes, or
service" in the ADA's preemption clause to refer to the prices,
schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point transporta-
tion of passengers, cargo, or mail. . . . [A]llowing smoking on
Northwest's trans-Pacific flights does not constitute a "service." An
airline's decision to permit (or not to permit) smoking on a flight is
not a decision dealing with "the frequency and scheduling of trans-
portation, [or] the selection of markets to or from which transpor-
tation is provided."
See Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 208 F.3d 1112, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261, 1265-66 (9th Cir.
1998) (en banc)).
455 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 445, at 10.
456 Id.
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C.F.R. § 25.810, which covers escape routes from planes and
mandates that airstair designs must not impede emergency pas-
senger egress.45 7 Also pertaining to emergency egress and stair
designs is 14 C.F.R. § 23.783.458 Although these regulations con-
cerned integrated stair designs, the district court reasoned that
this case was "concerned not with emergency egress, but rather
with safety standards regarding the placement of handrails on
airstairs provided for non-emergency ingress and egress. The
federal regulation does not address this topic, and the airline
has not presented any explanation as to why it has any applica-
tion in this case. ' 459
Finally, the district court discredited Fairchild Dornier's reli-
ance on In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litigation,460 noting that it
dealt with the highly regulated area of plane seat design, not
airstair design, and thus was of no help to the manufacturer.4 61
For this reason, and those previously discussed, the district court
denied Fairchild Dornier's motion for summary judgment on
the basis of federal preemption.4 62 The district court, however,
granted Fairchild Dornier's motion for summary judgment on
the basis that it had properly disclaimed liability in the sales
agreement. 463
Very little mention of this issue made its way into ChiefJudge
Alex Kozinski's appellate opinion, however.464 Instead, the
court released a one-paragraph "accompanying memoran-
dum ''46 in which it held that the limitations language in the
sales agreement did not bar Midwest Express from seeking in-
demnification from Fairchild Dornier.466 Although procedur-
457 See id. at 10-11.
458 Id. at 11.
459 Id.
460 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litigation, No. 04-1606 VRW, 2005 WL 591241
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2005), affd in part, rev'd in part, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007).
461 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 445, at 11-12.
462 Id. at 12.
463 Id. at 3, 19.
464 See generally Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555
F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009).
41. Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., No. 07-55063,
2009 WL 306216, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2009).
466 In the "accompanying memorandum," the court's entire opinion stated:
The limitations on liability in the purchase agreement do not bar
Midwest Express' claim against Fairchild Dornier and related enti-
ties. Because Midwest is seeking indemnity for the plaintiffs' per-
sonal injury damages, not suing for breach of warranty, the
warranty limitations do not apply. The clause waiving Midwest Ex-
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ally the court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of
the complaint, its opinion effectively agreed with the district
court's ultimate determination that federal preemption did not
bar Midwest Express's claim against Fairchild Dornier.467
Such a procedural move is interesting: why devote a one-para-
graph "accompanying memorandum" to the issue that ulti-
mately justified reversal of the district court's decision,468 yet
issue a multiple-page order agreeing that there was no federal
preemption, something the district court had already dis-
missed?4 69 The answer is likely that the court in Martin wished
to back away from its recent holding in Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines,
which had expressly adopted Abdullah,4 71 something the district
court in Martin resisted.471
Prior to the district court's granting of Fairchild Dornier's
motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals' deter-
mination on the issue of federal preemption, the Ninth Circuit
issued an opinion on federal preemption in Montalvo.4 72 On ap-
peal, Fairchild Dornier argued that Montalvo reached a different
conclusion than that of the district court in Martin, necessitating
reversal on the issue of federal preemption on the basis that the
FAA preempted Martin's personal injury claim and, it asserted,
Midwest Express's indemnity claim.473 And although the court
in Martin ultimately decided that Congress had not preempted
the specific issue in Martin, the three-judge panel disagreed in
the interpretation of Montalvo.4 7
4
press' right to recover consequential damages also does not bar the
claim, as the clause does not specifically foreclose indemnity. For
reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion, Midwest Express'
claim is not federally preempted.
Martin, 2009 WL 306216, at *1. Thus, the court in Martin reversed the district
court's order dismissing Midwest Express's complaint. Id.
467 See Martin, 555 F.3d at 812.
468 See Martin, 2009 WL 306216, at *1.
469 See Martin, 555 F.3d at 806.
470 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007).
471 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 445, at 9 n.4.
472 Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468.
473 Answering Brief of Appellees at 13-14, Midwest Express Holdings, Inc. v.
Braun, 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-55063).
474 Martin, 555 F.3d at 812 (Bea, J., concurring) ("I agree the district court's
order dismissing the complaint should be reversed, but to another result. This is
because I read Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007), quite dif-
ferently than does the majority.").
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Central to the majority's decision in Martin was its reading of
Montalvo.47 5 ChiefJudge Kozinski and Judge Huff476 interpreted
Montalvo differently than Judge Bea.4 77  The manufacturer
urged the court to read Montalvo broadly, arguing that "the FAA
preempts all personal injury claims by airline passengers, except
claims based on violations of specific federal regulations. "478
The majority thought otherwise, stating that Montalvo "cuts
against the manufacturer's argument for broad FAA preemp-
tion. '47 9 Montalvo, the majority reasoned, "rested heavily" on
the extensive federal regulations surrounding passenger warn-
ings pertaining to seatbelts.48 ° The majority thought the manu-
facturer's argument was negated by Montalvo's treatment of the
seating configuration issue in which the plaintiffs never alleged
violation of federal regulations and in which the court in Mon-
talvo did not "consider [FAA] preemption at all."481 Instead, as
the majority pointed out, Montalvo considered seat configura-
tion under the ADA's express preemption clause.48 2 If the
Ninth Circuit thought the FAA preempted all personal injury
claims, the majority reasoned, why even consider the ADA at
all?48 3
The majority's reasoning in Martin
springs from Montalvo's different treatment of the seating config-
uration and failure to warn claims. If Montalvo had held that the
FAA preempts all state law personal injury claims, it would have
been unnecessary to reverse the district court's dismissal of the
seating configuration claim and remand for further considera-
tion of ADA preemption. 484
As such, the majority interpreted Montalvo to:
neither preclude [ ] all claims except those based on violations of
specific federal regulations, nor require [ ] federal courts to inde-
pendently develop a standard of care when there are no relevant
federal regulations. Instead, it means that when the agency is-
475 See id. at 809-11.
476 United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting
by designation.
477 Compare Martin, 555 F.3d at 809-11 (majority opinion), with id. at 812-16
(Bea, J., concurring).
478 Id. at 810 (majority opinion).
479 Id. at 809.
480 Id. at 809-10.
481 Id. at 810.
482 Id.
483 Id.
-4 Id. (emphasis in original).
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sues "pervasive regulations" in an area, like passenger warnings,
the FAA preempts all [state-law] claims in that area. In areas
without pervasive regulations or other grounds for preemption,
the state standard of care remains applicable.485
Stepping back from Montalvo, the majority in Martin adopted
a fact-intensive determination of whether preemption exists.4 8 6
Absent pervasive regulations or other compelling indicia of pre-
emption, various state standards of care control.4 7 Thus, pre-
emption may exist (and, it follows, a federal standard of care
applies) in some types of personal injury claims while other per-
sonal injury claims can still be governed by state law.488 In es-
sence, there is no wholesale preemption of state law standards of
care for personal injury claims as Montalvo might suggest.4"9
Having lost its Montalvo arguments, Fairchild-Dornier made a
last-ditch argument that the federal certification process
preempts product defect claims.49 ° Although various federal
regulations might influence airplane component design, such as
airstairs, the court was not convinced of any indication of intent
"to pervasively regulate every aspect of plane design."4 9' Indeed,
the majority closed its opinion stating:
Airstairs are not pervasively regulated; the only regulation on air-
stairs is that they can't be designed in a way that might block the
emergency exits. The regulations have nothing to say about
handrails, or even stairs at all, except in emergency landings. No
federal regulation prohibits airstairs that are prone to ice over, or
that tend to collapse under passengers' weight. The regulations
say nothing about maintaining the stairs free of slippery sub-
stances, or fixing loose steps before passengers catch their heels
and trip. It's hard to imagine that any and all state tort claims
involving airplane stairs are preempted by federal law. Because
the agency has not comprehensively regulated airstairs, the FAA
has not preempted [state-law] claims that the stairs are
defective. 492
485 Id. at 811 (The majority in Martin noted that this viewpoint had been





490 Id. at 811-12 ("To certify a plane design, the manufacturer must show that
it meets the agency's regulations, and 'that no feature or characteristic makes it
unsafe."') (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 21.21(b) (2) (2009)).
491 Id. at 812 (referencing 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.16, 21.21, 25.341, 25.561, 25.601
(2009)).
492 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Thus, the court in Martin determined there was no federal
preemption in this instance, essentially concurring in the result
of the district court's decision.4 93
1. Minority Concurring Opinion
Judge Bea concurred that the district court order should be
reversed but interpreted Montalvo "quite differently" than the
majority.4 9 4 Pointing out that in Montalvo claims were brought
both for negligent design and negligent configuration of the
plane's seats, Judge Bea distinguished the majority's interpreta-
tion on the basis that the Montalvo plaintiffs never appealed dis-
missal of their negligent seat-design claim.495
[T] he lesson of Montalvo is that the plaintiffs thought so little of
the idea that federal law did not preempt state theories of negli-
gent design liability that they chose to let dead dogs lie by not
even attempting to resuscitate that claim by appeal. But note,
there was no more "pervasive" federal regulation of seat design
than there is of stairway bannister design.' 96
Moreover, Judge Bea felt that the court's language in Mon-
talvo expressly adopted the Third Circuit's approach in Abdul-
lah.4 97 "Montalvo still provides the framework by which we
analyze preemption of state tort law actions against airlines, and
I think the solution to this case lies in Montalvo's plain text:
'[w]e adopt the Third Circuit's broad, historical approach [in
Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.] ""'I However, the issues in
Abdullah were pervasively regulated while the issue before the
court in Martin did not fall under specific regulation.499 Thus,
the true question before the court, Judge Bea felt, "[was]
whether the Abdullah rule [as adopted by Montalvo], which es-
tablishes federal preemption of state standards of care in state
law personal injury actions against airlines, applies to negligent
design actions in which the FAA has not promulgated relevant
regulations describing the particular obligations of the air-
line."500 Contrary to the majority's interpretation, Judge Bea in-
terpreted Montalvo's adoption of Abdullah to allow expert
-3 See id.
494 Id. at 812-13 (Bea, J., concurring).
495 Id. at 813.
496 Id.
497 Id.; Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
498 Martin, 555 F.3d at 813 (Bea, J., concurring).
499 Id. at 814.
500 Id.
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testimony to assist a fact finder in determining what the appro-
priate standard of care is when not expressly stated by federal
regulation.
In sum, Judge Bea read Montalvo to require remand in Martin
to the district court in order to determine the appropriate fed-
eral standard of care while retaining state standards for the re-
maining negligence elements, an approach consistent with
Abdullah.5 °2 Otherwise, according to Judge Bea:
Without federal preemption of the standard of care in personal
injury tort actions, airlines and airplane manufacturers would be
subject to the standard of care in whichever state their planes
happen to be in (or over) when the injury occurs; the majority's
rule essentially means airlines and airplane manufacturers must
prepare for fifty kinds of liability. With federal preemption of
the standard of care, both airlines and airplane manufacturers,
on the one hand, and passengers, on the other, would have some
manageable guidance regarding duties owed. Further, by al-
lowing the states to determine the elements of breach, causation
and, most importantly, damages, the Abdullah approach allows
states to maintain individual policy priorities in line with Con-
gress's intent to preserve [state-law] remedies.5 °3
Martin is unique in that the Ninth Circuit spent only one para-
graph, in a separate memorandum opinion, reversing the dis-
trict court's decision pertaining to contractual limitations of
liability,50 4 yet dedicated multiple pages to interpreting the
Ninth Circuit's prior federal aviation preemption decision in
Montalvo, essentially concurring with the result reached by the
district court. 5 ' Clearly, the majority in Martin felt a need to
back away from Montalvo's wholesale endorsement of Abdullah's
finding of implied preemption of state law standards of care.50 6
Indeed, the majority distinguished Montalvo as only standing for
standard of care preemption in instances of pervasive regula-
tions or when other preemption doctrines are met, not the
broad interpretation advocated by Fairchild Dornier.507
501 Id. at 815.
502 Id. at 816.
503 Id. (multiple citations omitted).
504 See Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., No. 07-55063,
2009 WL 306216, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2009).
505 See Martin, 555 F.3d at 809-12.
506 See id. at 809.
507 See id. at 811.
2011] 395
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
But Martin cites Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corporation as a fur-
ther example of the validity of such an interpretation.' To the
extent that Cleveland is no longer good law, as is discussed in
Part IV.E., the majority's conclusion in Martin may well be sus-
ceptible to challenge by proponents of a broad federal standard
of care preemption.
E. TENTH CIRCUIT: CLEVELAND TO O'DONNELL
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.5 °9 is often cited by counsel op-
posing the application of federal law to aviation claims. In 1983,
Edward Cleveland was injured while attempting to takeoff from
a New Mexico airstrip in a Piper Super Cub.510 The Super Cub
was towing an unpowered glider that was to be filmed by Cleve-
land and a cinematographer for an advertisement.5 1 To facili-
tate the photography, Cleveland removed the pilot's seat and
installed a camera in its place.5"2 Cleveland then attempted to
control the plane from the rear seat.513 The owner of the air-
port became concerned about the safety of Cleveland's pro-
posed operation and closed the runway, parking his van at one
end to prevent takeoffs and landings. 514 Undeterred, Cleveland
attempted to takeoff while piloting the plane from the rear
seat.515 Inevitably, Cleveland hit the parked van during takeoff,
struck the mounted camera inside the plane, and suffered se-
vere brain injuries.51 6 Cleveland's wife brought suit on his
behalf.517
The jury found Piper liable for design defects in the airplane,
but the judgment was reversed and remanded based on an error
508 Id. at 811 ("This conclusion accords with the decisions of other circuits,
refusing to find various defective product claims impliedly preempted by the FAA
in the absence of relevant and pervasive regulations on the allegedly defective
part.") (citing Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1445 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993), abrogated by Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000)).
509 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989), reh'g de-
nied, 898 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1990). See also discussion infra notes 579-81.
510 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1440.
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in the jury instructions.511 On remand, Piper sought leave to
amend its answer to assert federal preemption (under the FAA)
as an affirmative defense. 519 Although the district court granted
leave to amend, it later denied Piper's motion for summary
judgment based on preemption.52 ° Piper then sought and was
granted an interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit.521
The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs' design-de-
fect claims were not preempted by the FAA for two key reasons.
First was the presence of a saving clause in the FAA, which pro-
vides, "Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but
the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies. "522
The Cleveland panel reasoned that the saving clause, by stating
Congress's intention not to limit remedies available to claim-
ants, arguably limited the extent to which Congress had entered
the field of aviation safety and "show[ed] that Congress did not
intend to occupy the field of airplane safety to the exclusion of
the state common law. ' 523 The court supported this conclusion
by equating the word "remedies" with state law tort liability gen-
erally, reasoning that "[b]y its very words, the [FAA] leaves in
place remedies then existing at common law or by statute. 524
The court also noted that when Congress enacted the FAA in
1958, tort liability for product design defects was widely recog-
nized in the states and had been extended specifically to air-
plane accident cases.525
Second, the Cleveland court noted that the FAA "contains an
express preemption provision that 'relates to rates, routes[,] or
services of any carrier.'- 526 The Act's express preemption clause
provides that "a State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regula-
tion, or other provision having the force and effect of law re-
518 See Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540, 1546-51, 1556 (10th
Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 898 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1990).
.519 See Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1440-41 (10th Cir. 1993).
520 Id. at 1447.
521 See id. at 1440.
522 49 U.S.C. App. § 1506 (recodified as 49 U.S.C. § 40120 (2006)).
523 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1442 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster, 635 F.2d 67,
74-75 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400, 407 (9th Cir.
1983) (dictum)).
524 Id. at 1442-43.
525 Id. at 1443.
526 Id. at 1443 n.1l.
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lated to a price, route, or service of an air carrier '527 but makes
no similar provision for air safety.52 Viewing this as an apparent
dichotomy within the provision, the court used the rule of statu-
tory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the expres-
sion of one thing is the exclusion of the other-to conclude that
the express provision "excluded consideration of all forms of im-
plied preemption. ' 529 Also relying on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Cipollone, the Cleveland panel held that "implied
preemption is generally inapplicable to a federal statute that
contains an express preemption provision. "530
Both of these conclusions had been challenged-and even
subjected to criticism-before the Tenth Circuit issued its opin-
ion in US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell.5 1' As we have discussed ear-
lier, the Supreme Court had previously made clear, directly
contradicting a substantial part of the Cleveland court's reason-
ing,53 2 that "an express preemption provision [in a federal stat-
ute] does not, by itself, foreclose" finding that the statute also
impliedly preempts the field 533 and that a clause saving state civil
remedies does not mean that state safety standards can be ap-
plied when Congress has evinced an intent to occupy the
field. 5 4 And with increasing scrutiny and disagreement by
527 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1997). The express preemption clause was added
to the FAA pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504,
92 Stat. 1705.
528 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1443.
529 Id. at 1443, 1447.
590 Id. at 1447 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)
("[E] nactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies
that matters beyond that reach are not preempted.")); See also supra note 10 and
text accompanying.
531 See, e.g., Curtin v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 183 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (noting that the Tenth Circuit's logic in Cleveland had been undercut by
recent Supreme Court decisions). The Curtin court was not persuaded by the
Tenth Circuit's reasoning and instead agreed with the First and Third Circuits'
decisions that the FAA implicitly preempted the field of air safety. "The compre-
hensive federal regulatory scheme covering emergency evacuation procedures,
the manifest purpose of the FAA to ensure safety, and the legislative history [of
the FAA and ADA] all favor finding that the standard of care is a matter of fed-
eral, not state, law." Id. at 671.
532 See supra Part II.A-B.
533 Choate v. Champion Home Builders Co., 222 F.3d 788, 794 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) and
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995)).
534 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 (2000) ("The evident purpose
of the saving clauses is to preserve state laws[,] which, rather than imposing sub-
stantive regulation of a vessel's primary conduct, establish liability rules and fi-
nancial requirements relating to oil spills.").
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other courts, the Tenth Circuit seemingly abrogated Cleveland's
rationale when it decided US Airways, Inc. v. O'DonnelL535
1. US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell
In November 2006, Dana Papst flew from Phoenix to Albu-
querque on US Airways.536 Mr. Papst reportedly "purchased and
consumed alcoholic beverages during [the] flight. ' 537 About
three hours after deplaning in Albuquerque, during his drive
home from the airport, Mr. Papst caused an automobile acci-
dent in which he and five others were killed.53 8 His blood-alco-
hol content at the time of the accident was approximately
0.329%. 53' The FAA investigated the accident but "declined to
take any action against [US] Airways or its employees." 540
Two months later, "[i]n January 2007, the Alcohol and Gam-
ing Division (AGD) of the New Mexico Regulation and Licens-
ing Department" cited US Airways for "serv[ing] alcohol to an
intoxicated person, [specifically] Dana Papst. ' 541 "The AGD
also served ... a cease-and-desist order directing [the airline] to
'refrain from selling, serving[,] and otherwise dispensing, stor-
ing[,] or possessing alcoholic beverages of any kind in the State
of New Mexico' without properly complying with the require-
ments of [the New Mexico Liquor Control Act] (NMLCA)."542
In February 2007, [after] noting its belief that federal law pre-
empted the application of the NMLCA to [its operations], [US]
Airways applied for a public service license to serve alcoholic bev-
erages to passengers on aircraft in New Mexico. In response to
535 US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2010).
536 Id. at 1322.
537 Id. Mr. Papst, a computer network administrator employed by the Santa Fe
Opera, had attended a training session in Sacramento. Afterward, he took vaca-
tion time to travel to Reno. While Mr. Papst was returning from Reno to New
Mexico on US Airways, flight attendants served him two miniature bottles of alco-
hol, even though he appeared already intoxicated to other passengers on board.
Police reported that while driving to his home from the airport, Mr. Papst
stopped at a convenience store and bought a six-pack of beer. Near an interstate
exit, Mr. Papst apparently became disoriented and began traveling back toward
Santa Fe on the wrong side of the interstate when the crash occurred. See Anne
Constable, Opera, Papst Estate Settle with Family, SANTA FE NEw MEXICAN (Oct. 22,
2008), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/PrintStory/Opera-Papst-estate-set-
tie-with-family.
538 O'Donnell, 627 F.3d at 1322.
539 Id.
540 Id.
541 Id. at 1322-23.
542 Id. at 1323.
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the application, AGD issued [the airline] a ninety-day temporary
license. However, in June 2007, [at the expiration of the ninety
days], AGD declined to extend [the] temporary license explain-
ing that [the airline's] alcohol server training did not comply
with NMLCA's requirements.543
Ultimately, AGD "rejected [US] Airways' application for a li-
cense in November 2007 citing as reasons" both the Papst acci-
dent "and another incident... involv[ing] a passenger who had
been served alcoholic beverages on a [US] Airways flight and
was [arrested for drunk driving about] an hour after he had de-
planed at Albuquerque. 544
In response to the state's actions, US Airways filed suit in fed-
eral court "seeking to enjoin New Mexico state officials [in the
AGD and the New Mexico Regulation and Licensing Depart-
ment] from enforcing laws that purport to govern [US] Airways'
alcoholic beverage service on flights departing from or arriving
into New Mexico. "' 55 Asserting "both express and implied pre-
emption in support of [the] injunction... [US] Airways argued
that [enforcing the] NMLCA against an airline violated the
Supremacy Clause . . . [because] the ADA expressly preempts
state regulation of airline services, including" serving alcoholic
beverages to airline passengers. 546 "Alternatively, [US] Airways
[argued] that federal law impliedly preempts [applying the]
NMLCA to [an] airline[ ]" because doing so necessarily impli-
cates "aviation safety, which federal law regulates to the exclu-
sion of state regulation. "547 "[US] Airways [also] asserted that
New Mexico's regulatory efforts could not be otherwise author-
ized pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment to the
Constitution. 548
"The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 549
"The district court concluded that federal law neither expressly
nor impliedly preempt[ed] New Mexico's regulation of the alco-
holic beverage service" provided by airlines.550 "[T]he district
court narrowly construed the [ADA's] explicit preemption pro-
vision. . . , concluding that the provision's reference to 'service'
543 Id. (internal citations omitted).
544 Id.





550 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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did not include an airline's alcoholic beverage service. '"551 "The
district court reasoned that [a] narrow" reading of "service" was
necessary to avoid the ADA preemption provision's violation of
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.552 "[T] he district
court [also] addressed field preemption and concluded that fed-
eral law did not preempt the field of alcohol service on airlines,"
reasoning that "Congress was addressing the need for exclusive
and complete rules for the physical and mechanical operation
of aircraft. '55 3 "The district court ... denied [US] Airways' mo-
tion for summary judgment and granted New Mexico's
motion. 5
54
"On appeal, [US] Airways reassert[ed] its contention that fed-
eral law both expressly and impliedly preempt[ed the]
NMLCA's regulation of an airline's alcoholic beverage service
provided [aboard its own] aircraft."5 55 The airline also argued
that New Mexico could not avoid preemption of the NMLCA by
trying to rely on the Twenty-first Amendment. 556
US Airways' opening brief to the Tenth Circuit argued that
applying the NMLCA to its operations was both expressly and
impliedly preempted. 7 The airline's express preemption argu-
ment was made in four parts.558 First, the plain language of the
ADA bars state regulation "related to" any airline "service.
US Airways argued that the phrase "related to" has always been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to be exceptionally broad in
the context of finding federal preemption. 560 The airline also
551 Id.
552 Id. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: "The transportation
or importation into any State .... for delivery or use therein of intoxicating li-
quors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI, § 2.
553 O'Donnell, 627 F.3d at 1323.
554 Id. at 1324.
555 Id.
556 Id.
557 Brief for Appellant US Airways, Inc. at 16, US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell,
627 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2271).
558 See id. at 16-29.
559 Id. at 17 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1997)).
560 Id. (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)
("Since the relevant language of the ADA is identical [to the 'related to' provi-
sion of ERISA], we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard here: State
enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline 'rates,
routes, or services' are [preempted].")).
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argued that serving alcohol onboard its flights was a "service"
within the definition of the statute.56'
Second, the Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA preemp-
tion language broadly, calling it "conspicuous for its breadth.
5 62
Elsewhere, the Court has provided examples of those circum-
stances in which the ADA preemption provision should be ap-
plied broadly:
(1) that "[s] tate enforcement actions having a connection with. .
carrier "'rates, routes, or services' are [preempted]"; (2) that
such [preemption] may occur even if a state law's effect on rates,
routes or services "is only indirect"; (3) that, [with] respect to
[preemption], it makes no difference whether a state law is "con-
sistent" or "inconsistent" with federal regulation; and (4) that
[preemption] occurs at least where state laws have a "significant
impact" related to Congress's deregulatory and [preemption]-re-
lated objectives.563
Third, US Airways argued that the New Mexico district court's
analysis was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transportation Ass'n.64 Fourth, for
purely pragmatic reasons, Congress could not have intended to
permit state regulation of airline services. 565 Having to comply
with the laws and regulations-on food labeling, warnings of
risks of carcinogens, and liquor sales to name just three-of
each of the states in which (and perhaps over which) they oper-
ate would impose complex and costly burdens on an already
overburdened domestic air transportation system.566
Having heard US Airways's argument, the Tenth Circuit lim-
ited its analysis to US Airways' implied preemption argument,
stating "[b]ecause we conclude that applying New Mexico's reg-
ulatory scheme to [US] Airways implicates the field of aviation
safety that Congress intended federal law to regulate exclusively,
we need not reach the question of express preemption. '567 This
limitation was, in turn, based on the court's finding that the
561 Id. at 17-18 (citing Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.
1995) (en banc) ("Elements of the air carrier service bargain include items such
as ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage han-
dling, in addition to the transportation itself.")).
562 Id. at 18 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 384).
563 Id. at 18-19 (quoting Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364,
370-71 (2008) (internal citation omitted)).
564 Id. at 22-23 (citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370-71).
565 Id. at 26.
566 See id. at 26-29.
567 US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010).
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"field" in which the NMLCA's regulation is applied is not just an
airline's alcoholic beverage service, as New Mexico contended,
but rather the broader field of aviation safety.5 68
The court supported its conclusion in two ways. First, it noted
that the Federal Aviation Administration, pursuant to the FAA,
recognized the safety implications of serving alcohol aboard air-
lines and promulgated regulations on how, to whom, and by
whom alcohol may be served.569 The court of appeals found
these regulations as evidence that airlines' service of alcohol im-
plicated greater safety concerns than just serving alcohol. 570 For
instance, airlines are concerned not only about passengers'
safety but also want to avoid situations where an intoxicated pas-
senger becomes a security risk-potentially endangering other
passengers and the flightcrew or obstructing flight operations-
causing flight diversions.57' Second, the court found that the
"NMLCA's regulatory scheme extends beyond the field of air-
line alcoholic beverage services" because it requires training and
certification for airline crew members serving alcohol on an
aircraft.572
Having established that aviation safety was "the legislative field
at issue," the court next turned to "whether Congress intended
to occupy [that] field to the exclusion of the states." '73 Caution-
ing that because "Congress does not cavalierly [preempt] state-
568 Id. at 1325.
569 Id.; see 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 (2009); see also Drinking and Serving of Alcoholic
Beverages, 25 Fed. Reg. 168, 168-69 (Jan. 9, 1960) (discussing the safety concerns
associated with an airline's alcoholic beverage service).
570 O'Donnell, 627 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("Federal regulations have no less preemptive
effect than statutes.")).
571 See, e.g., 'Drunk' British Passenger Forces Plane to Divert to Alaska After Threaten-
ing to Attack Pilot, THE DAILY MAIL (Apr. 7, 2010), http://wv.dailymail.co.uk/
news/worldnews/article-1264110/Drunk-British-passenger-forces-plane-divert-
Alaska.html; Drunk Passenger Forces Flight to Make Emergency Landing in Colorado
Springs with F-16 Escorts, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/08/drunk-passenger-forces-fl-n416891.html.
572 O'Donnell, 627 F.3d at 1325 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-6E4 (West 2010)
("No person shall be employed as a server on a licensed premises unless that
person obtains within thirty days of employment alcohol server training pursuant
to the provisions of [N.M. Stat. § 60-6E-1 et seq.]") and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-6E-
5B (West 2010) (delineating the subjects that the training program for employ-
ees serving alcoholic beverage must cover)).
573 Id. (citing Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555
F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2009) ("To find field preemption here, we must infer that
Congress intended to exclude all state law ... from [this] area ... even though it
didn't say so.")).
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law causes of action, the court noted that the purpose of
Congress must be clear before a court may conclude that Con-
gress has preempted state law.575 Exercising that caution, the
court concluded that "the field of aviation safety 'has long been
dominated by federal interests"" 7 6 and from that concluded the
normal presumption against finding state law preemption did
not apply.577 The court summed up by concluding "that the
comprehensive regulatory scheme promulgated pursuant to the
FAA evidences the intent for federal law to occupy the field of
aviation safety exclusively.
578
The ODonnell court's conclusion about congressional intent
marked a significant departure from its earlier decision in Cleve-
land v. Piper Aircraft Corp.579 Before ODonnell, a number of
courts already disagreed with or declined to follow Cleveland.58
Others, while conceding that Cleveland had been weakened by
Geier, continued to follow it, either because the court was com-
pelled to follow it as circuit precedent581 or because they did not
agree that Abdullah was a better-reasoned decision.5 s2 'Donnell,
574 Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
575 Id.
576 Id. (quoting Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007)).
577 Id. (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48
(2001) (explaining that the presumption against preemption did not apply be-
cause the field at issue was "hardly a field [that] the States have traditionally
occupied") (internal citation and quotation omitted)).
578 Id. at 1327.
579 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1993).
Cleveland deals with general aviation. Plaintiffs commonly argue that there can
be no preemption in the field of general aviation-express, implied, field, or
otherwise-because if there were preemption, a plaintiff would be left without a
remedy because the FAA did not create a federal cause of action. See, e.g., John
D. McClune, There Is No Complete, Implied, or Field Federal Preemption of State Law
Personal Injury/Wrongful Death Negligence or Product Liability Claims in General Avia-
tion Cases, 71J. AIR L. & COM. 717, 727 (2006) (citing Margolis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1993)). As the Third Circuit in Abdullah
recognized, however, the FAA's saving clause may properly be read to retain a
plaintiffs state-law remedy, while the standard of care is preempted. Abdullah v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 1999).
580 See, e.g., Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 372; Aldana v. Air E. Airways, Inc., 477 F.
Supp. 2d 489, 492-93 (D. Conn. 2007).
581 See, e.g., Hart v. Boeing Co., No. 09-cv-00397-REB-MEH, 2009 WL 4250122,
at *2-4 (D. Colo. Nov. 23, 2009) (conceding that Cleveland is an "outlier" and has
been "undermined" by Geier, the court said "regardless whether these opinions
[contrary to Cleveland] are better reasoned and more persuasive from an intellec-
tual standpoint, I do not write on a clean slate [in the Tenth Circuit], but am
bound to follow Cleveland.")
582 See, e.g., Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 835 (E.D. Tex.
2006) (concluding that Cleveland was consistent with its facts, still good law in the
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however, must put Cleveland's continued utility in doubt, as its
days as good law in the Tenth Circuit are numbered, if not al-
ready ended. If so, many of the decisions relying on Cleveland
may also be susceptible to attack. Given that Cleveland and
Abdullah are cited as "the seminal cases supporting each [oppos-
ing] view" on the issue of preemption,583 a reemergence of cases
asserting FAA federal preemption in the Third, Fifth, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits is quite likely.
Express preemption under the ADA was the first argument in
US Airways's opening brief, suggesting the airline believed that
the touchstone of preemption-congressional intent-was to be
found in Congress's express language. 584 Analyzing the two
types of preemption in this order also makes intuitive sense. If
congressional intent is key, and such intent is clear from the
language of a federal law, there is no need to go further by first
defining the field in which the federal law operates and then
deciding whether the law occupies the field to the exclusion of
state statutes or regulations. This also is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's observation that express preemption is typically a
simpler analysis than implied preemption. 5  The O'Donnell
panel, however, offered little to explain why it opted to decide
the case on the less well-defined-and arguably more difficult-
grounds of implied field preemption under the FAA.586
On the basis of judicial economy and efficiency alone, it ap-
pears that the court went out of its way to decide the case on
implied preemption grounds. Stated more bluntly, it appears
Tenth Circuit, and "better reasoned" than the Third Circuit's decision in Abdul-
lah); Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL 1084103, at
*21-22 (D.S.D. April 20, 2006) (finding Cleveland "more persuasive" than Abdul-
lah and, accordingly, adopting the Tenth Circuit's rationale); Snyder-Stulginkis v.
United Airlines, No. 01-C-185, 2001 WL 1105128, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2001)
(citing Cleveland as support of its decision that the FAA did not preempt state
law).
583 Sheesley, 2006 WL 1084103, at *19.
584 See Brief for Appellant US Airways, Inc., supra note 557, at 17.
585 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) ("[Preemption]
fundamentally is a question of congressional intent, and when Congress has
made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an
easy one.") (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299
(1988)); see also Choate v. Champion Home Builders, Inc., 222 F.3d 788, 792
(10th Cir. 2000).
586 See US Airways v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Be-
cause we conclude that applying New Mexico's regulatory scheme to [US] Air-
ways implicates the field of aviation safety that Congress intended federal law to
regulate exclusively, we need not reach the question of express preemption.").
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that the court had, for reasons left unstated, chosen implied pre-
emption as the basis of its decision to reconcile the Tenth Cir-
cuit preemption caselaw (principally Cleveland) with Geier 87 and
to bring it more in line with other circuits.588 Had the court
gone the other way and based its decision on express preemp-
tion under the ADA, it would not have needed to address the
broader issue of implied field preemption under the FAA and
make the case apply to both airlines (O'Donnell) and general avi-
ation operations (Cleveland).
V. CONCLUSION
The federal preemption arguments currently being posed in
aviation cases are not new. Federal courts continue to wrestle
with the issue just as they have over the past several decades.
Recent cases are no different; federal courts recognize the mer-
its for and against recognition of federal preemption in aviation
cases. With the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in ODonnell rec-
ognizing the numbered days of Cleveland, however, federal pre-
emption opponents' arguments may have lost some luster. This
is far from certain, as evidenced by other circuits' reluctance to
embrace fully arguments about implied preemption under the
FAA. Aviation practitioners must remain apprised of the newest
developments in this area as both points of view retain merit. At
least, that is, until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise.
587 Id. at 1326.
588 Id. at 1327.
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